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I. INTRODUCTION 
International enforcement of the world’s antitrust laws is a 
developing project, but recovery for private victims remains elusive 
due to the complexities of national sovereignty.1 To illustrate, suppose 
all of the wool textile manufacturers in Pakistan agree to fix the price 
of cotton textiles. One of these cartelist in turn signs a contract in 
Karachi for the sale of cotton textiles to a non-wholly owned subsidiary 
of a US clothier located in Sri Lanka, which takes the textiles and 
manufactures pants. It sells these pants to its parent company at cost 
for distribution around the world, which includes retail outlets in the 
United States. Assuming the price of the cotton textiles was higher than 
it otherwise would have been but for the price-fixing agreement, where 
is the proper locale for the US clothier to seek redress, personal 
jurisdiction over defendants and other procedural arguments aside, and 
what is the proper applicable law?2 Is the nexus to the United States 
                                                                                                                       
1. For clarity’s sake, the term “antitrust” is an American convention, whereas the more 
commonly employed synonymous term is “competition.” See ELEANORA POLI, ANTITRUST 
INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES IN THE GLOBALISING ECONOMY 2 (2016) (describing the genesis 
of the American “antitrust” as relating back to the late nineteenth century when US cartelists 
would label their joint activities “trusts” to conceal their collusive nature); PETER MORICI, 
ANTITRUST IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM: RECONCILING U.S., JAPANESE, AND EU 
APPROACHES 3-4 (2000) (noting that though competition policy has a broader meaning than 
antitrust policy in most cases, the terms are used interchangeably); Diane P. Wood, The 
Impossible Dream: Real International Antitrust, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277, 278 (1992) (noting 
that “antitrust” is synonymous with “competition” and “antimonopoly”). Labels may vary by 
country, such as in China where “antimonopoly” is used or in France where “concurrence” is 
used for the body of law. See 中华人民共和国反垄断法 (Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s 
Republic of China) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, 
effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (China) 
(setting out China’s antitrust law); CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.][COMMERCIAL CODE] arts. 
410-1 to 470-8 (Fr.) (book IV entitled “de la liberté des prix et de la concurrence,” or “Freedom 
of Prices and Competition”). 
2. As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to highlight that in such conflicts-of-law 
situations courts will typically dismiss cases rather than apply foreign regulatory law, such as 
antitrust law, due in part to the longstanding principle that states will not apply the penal, tax, or 
regulatory rules of another state. See William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws 
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strong enough to justify subjecting the Pakistani cotton producers to 
US antitrust law, or does the existence of a foreign non-wholly owned 
intermediary purchaser and a non-US point of sale sufficiently weaken 
the United States’ interest in applying its own laws? What if the 
Pakistani cotton textile manufacturers had no knowledge of the initial 
purchaser’s corporate ownership, which would have intimated the 
possibility of the price-fixed cotton textiles ending up in the United 
States? And surely Pakistan would take issue with the United States 
imposing US law in private litigation to the detriment of a large portion 
of the Pakistani economy and Pakistan’s ability to independently 
regulate its own commercial affairs.3 
In the past fifty years the world has experienced a marked increase 
in international trade. Global exports have exploded (in constant 2010 
                                                                                                                       
Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 109 (1998) 
(discussing that US courts dismiss cases where foreign antitrust law governs); Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International Law, and 
Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS 311, 322ff (1979) 
(expounding the “public law tabu” that explains why states decline to apply foreign penal, tax, 
and regulatory laws in domestic fora). 
3. Indeed, these issues have been voiced in recent influential cases on US antitrust law 
extraterritoriality. See Brief of the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petitioners at 2, F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) 
(No. 03-724) (“Germany also has an interest in seeing that German companies are not subject 
to the extraterritorial reach of the United States’ antitrust laws by private foreign plaintiffs – 
whose injuries were sustained in transactions entirely outside United States commerce – seeking 
treble damages in private lawsuits against German companies.”); Brief of the Korea Fair Trade 
Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees’ Opposition to Rehearing En Banc at 3, 
Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-8003) 
[hereinafter KFTC Motorola Brief] (“Under prevailing international norms, claims should be 
brought in a country in which the underlying transactions took place and should be governed by 
the laws of that country rather than by the antitrust laws of the U.S., the commerce of which was 
not directly affected by the transactions.”); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry of Japan in Support of Appellees at 5, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU 
Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-8003) [hereinafter Japan Motorola Brief] 
(“[T]he Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan [is concerned] that the applicability 
of treble damages, which are not common outside the US, will be expanded through excessive 
extraterritorial application of US competition law, and that, as a result, Japan’s ability to regulate 
its own commercial affairs will be interfered.”); Brief for Amicus Curiae her Majesty the Queen 
in Right of the Province of Saskatchewan, Canada, in Support of Petitioners at 21, Agrium Inc. 
v. Minn-Chem, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-650) [hereinafter Saskatchewan 
Minn-Chem Brief] (“[T]he Seventh Circuit’s expansion of the FTAIA’s “direct” requirement to 
include any “reasonably proximate causal nexus,” as well as its interpretation of the “import 
commerce” provision of the FTAIA, will impede the legitimate interest of the Government of 
Saskatchewan to adopt and implement policies to maximize the efficient export of potash and 
other products.”). 
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dollars) from US$1.6 trillion in 1965 to US$22.7 trillion in 2015.4 Total 
exports’ share of the global economic activity more than doubled in the 
same period, from twelve percent to twenty-nine percent in 2015.5 But 
while markets for goods and services transcend national borders, 
antitrust laws regulating these markets are national in scope.6 
Historically, the United States has served as the primary enforcer of 
antitrust law for private litigants due to its early development of redress 
for these litigants, including the availability of treble damages and other 
plaintiff-friendly procedural mechanisms, as well as the progressively 
long extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act.7 Its evolution as the 
                                                                                                                       
4. World DataBank: World Development Indicators, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators# 
[https://perma.cc/2DTJ-YEW8] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (database of macroeconomic data). 
Average annual growth, estimated through a least-squares growth rate, was a healthy 5.2 percent. 
Id. 
5. Id. 
6. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Final Report of the International Competition Policy Advisory 
Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust 35-36 (2000), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/final-report [https://perma.cc/JPT3-MLX9] (last visited Oct. 26, 
2017) [hereinafter ICPAC Report] (describing the implications of globalization for international 
antitrust enforcement); Matthew Cooper, Comment, The Role of Positive Comity in U.S. 
Antitrust Enforcement Against Japanese Firms: A Mixed Review, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 
383, 383 (2001) (citing ICPAC Report). 
7. See WILBUR L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 45 (5th ed. 
1996) (“For years the United States was the only country with antitrust laws, and only in the 
past two decades have we seen the beginning of active enforcement in other countries of a scope 
to be compared to the U.S. antitrust laws.”); Reza Rajabiun, Private Enforcement and Judicial 
Discretion in the Evolution of Antitrust in the United States, 8 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 187, 191-
93 (2012) (discussing the divergence of the US antitrust enforcement system from the common 
mold of other countries); Susan E. Burnett, Comment, U.S. Judicial Imperialism Post Empagran 
v. F. Hoffman-La Roche? Conflicts of Jurisdiction and International Comity in Extraterritorial 
Antitrust, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 555, 571, 571 n.69 (2004) (noting that as of World War II, 
when extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act began, the United States was one of the few 
countries with developed antitrust laws and that while some European states had common-law 
or statute provisions against restrictive practices, the United States was the home of “antitrust”); 
Spencer Weber Waller, The United States as Antitrust Courtroom to the World: Jurisdiction and 
Standing Issues in Transnational Litigation, 14 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 523, 532 (2002) 
[hereinafter Waller, Courtroom] (explaining the incentives for plaintiffs to seek recovery of 
antitrust harm in US courts, including treble damages, extensive discovery, jury trials, class 
actions, contingent fees, and potential punitive damages). Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 15, not only grants private litigants the right to sue antitrust perpetrators but also the 
ability to collect threefold damages (treble damages) plus all fees related to bringing suit. 
The Sherman Act, enacted in 1890, prohibits companies from entering into agreements that 
restrain trade and proscribes anticompetitive conduct arising from or leading to monopoly. See 
15 U.S.C. § 1-7; STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE 
NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 97 (2015) (summarizing the Sherman Act); Charles W. Smitherman 
III, The Future of Global Competition Governance: Lessons from the Transatlantic, 19 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 769, 796-7 (2004) (same). To be clear, this Note will only address the 
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world’s antitrust courtroom was, of course, grounded in the interest of 
protecting national commerce and allowing its citizens to recover from 
wrongful acts committed at home or abroad.8 Internationally, 
widespread antitrust law only began to emerge decades later when, for 
instance, the European Union (“EU”) introduced its own antitrust law 
in the form of Articles 85 and 86 (now 101 and 102 in the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”)) in the 1957 Treaty 
of Rome, which initially founded the European Economic 
Community.9 The private right to sue would wait until 2014, when the 
European Commission (“EC”) issued Directive 2014/104/EU (“the EC 
Directive”),10 requiring EU member states to legislatively facilitate 
private enforcement of competition law at the national level.11 
                                                                                                                       
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act to foreign conduct, though it will reference “U.S. 
antitrust law” generally. It should be noted that US antitrust law, found in Title 15 of the U.S. 
Code, is comprised of several acts that are jurisprudentially different from the Sherman Act in 
terms of cross-border application. See Russell J. Davis, Annotation, Extraterritorial Application 
of Federal Antitrust Laws to Acts Occurring in Foreign Commerce, 40 A.L.R. Fed. 343, n.1 
(2016) (highlighting that the majority of antitrust actions involving extraterritorial conduct are 
brought under the Sherman Act due to the broader phrasing of its substantive provisions); Earl 
W. Kintner & Katherine Drew Hallgarten, Application of United States Antitrust Laws to 
Foreign Trade and Commerce—Variations on American Banana Since 1909, 15 B.C. INDUS. & 
COM. L. REV. 343, 365 n.104 (1973) (explaining the jurisdictional implications for the Clayton 
Act, another US antitrust statute). 
8. See infra § II. See also Edward D. Cavanagh, The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons 
from the American Experience, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 629, 629 (2010) [hereinafter Cavanagh, 
Lessons] (characterizing the American private right of action under antitrust law not just as a 
means to redress harm but also “as a complement to public enforcement to assure the detection 
and prosecution of antitrust offenders” where government resources were limited to accomplish 
these objectives). 
9. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11. The Treaty of Rome has since evolved into the TFEU, which was signed in 2007 
and is the current governing treaty of the European Union. See Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008 O.J. C 115/47 [hereinafter TFEU]. The 
European Union was formed from the European Economic Community with the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37. 
10. Directives are edicts of the European Union that require member states to achieve a 
certain result without articulating the means by which the result must be achieved. See TFEU 
art. 288 (“A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State 
to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and 
methods.”). 
11. Directive 2014/104/EU, 2014 O.J. L 349; see infra § II.B. While Australia has 
developed a limited system for private redress since the 1970s, private actions to recover harm 
from anticompetitive behavior are even rare in other English-speaking legal systems besides the 
United States, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, though recent UK law allowing for 
collective action suits may change that trend. See Rajabiun, supra note 7, at 192 n.19 (noting the 
lack of recourse for private victims of antitrust harm); John Pheasant, Private Antitrust Damages 
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With nowhere else to go, private litigants have naturally flocked 
to the United States for remedial assistance, creating an issue for 
developing antitrust regimes.12 Several implications attend foreign 
plaintiffs seeking recovery in the United States. American courts have 
recognized the importance of allowing foreign plaintiffs to bring claims 
in the United States under the Sherman Act.13 Before 2004, there was 
a significant chance that parties injured abroad by global cartels that 
directly harmed the United States would be able to sue in US courts to 
recover their losses.14 But, as illustrated above, private litigants 
                                                                                                                       
in Europe: The Policy Debate and Judicial Developments, 21 ANTITRUST 59, 59 (2006) 
(explaining that “the low level of reported cases [in Europe] suggests that [private] actions are 
still relatively rare”); Matthew O’Regan, United Kingdom: Consumer Rights Act 2015 
Introduces New Procedures for Competition Litigation, Including Collective Follow-On 
Damages Actions, KLUWER COMP. L. BLOG (Oct. 5 2015), 
http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2015/10/05/united-kingdom-consumer-rights-act-2015-
introduces-new-procedures-for-competition-litigation-including-collective-follow-on-
damages-actions/ [https://perma.cc/AS9L-ZBDB] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (“[The Consumer 
Rights Act 2015 provisions concerning private actions in competition law] have been described 
in the media as introducing ‘US-style class actions law suits’; whilst this is undoubtedly 
somewhat hyperbolic, it is clear that things will never be the same again.”); infra notes 18, 214. 
12. See S. Lynn Diamond, Note, Empagran, The FTAIA and Extraterritorial Effects: 
Guidance to Courts Facing Questions of Antitrust Jurisdiction Still Lacking, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L 
L. 805, 805 (2006) (“The United States has the most developed and aggressive antitrust regime 
in the world, so it is not surprising that parties injured by worldwide price-fixing conspiracies 
would prefer to litigate their claims here than anywhere else.”); Waller, Courtroom, supra note 
7, at 532 (describing the aspects of US law that make the United States a favorable litigation 
venue for private antitrust litigants). 
13. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314-315 (1978) (addressing in dicta 
that foreign purchasers generally had proper standing to bring claims under the Sherman Act); 
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgium World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 938 n.109 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (observing that “Congress has expressly allowed foreign corporations to sue for violations 
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.”). 
14. See Eleanor M. Fox, Remedies and the Courage of Convictions in a Globalized World: 
How Globalization Corrupts Relief, 80 TUL. L. REV. 571, 580-81 (2005) [hereinafter Fox, 
Remedies] (explaining that the US Supreme Court’s decision in F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. 
Empagran S.A. restricted the United States’ antitrust jurisdiction to hear claims from foreign 
plaintiffs alleging harm from a worldwide cartel if US defendants were no longer a party to the 
suit despite the cartel’s activities directly harming the United States); infra §§ II.A; III.B. After 
2004, American courts have reiterated that US antitrust adjudication is proper for foreign 
plaintiffs only if the injury the party endures – that is, the “effect” arising from the proscribed 
anticompetitive conduct – occurs with US borders. See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran 
S.A. (Empagran), 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004) (holding that only parties claiming domestic injury 
may maintain a US lawsuit under the Sherman Act); Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics 
Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2015) (asserting that US antitrust law is not meant to redress 
foreign victims realizing foreign harm); Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 858 
(7th Cir. 2012) (“U.S. antitrust laws are not to be used for injury to foreign customers . . . [but it 
is a] well-established principle that the U.S. antitrust laws reach foreign conduct that harms U.S. 
commerce.”); Lotes Co., Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd., 753 F.3d 395, 413-14 (2d 
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applying US antitrust law for redressing harm that occurred abroad 
create tensions over sovereignty with other countries.15 
Moreover, bringing claims to the United States strips valuable 
opportunities for young foreign antitrust regimes to develop their own 
jurisprudence, depressing the effectiveness of global antitrust 
enforcement and stalling the emergence of private redress.16 
                                                                                                                       
Cir. 2014) (finding that a foreign plaintiff harmed by foreign anticompetitive conduct that 
coincidentally caused a domestic effect was barred from bringing Sherman Act claims by the 
FTAIA because the domestic effect did not give rise to the foreign plaintiff’s claim). See infra 
§§ III, IV. 
15. See, e.g., Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 
67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159, 160-61 (1999) (discussing that aggressive extraterritorial application of 
the Sherman Act brought “considerable backlash from foreign governments”); Mark S. 
Popofsky, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Jurisprudence, in 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND 
POLICY 2417, 2423 (2008) (describing the controversy associated with US antitrust law 
extraterritoriality with US trading partners). See also infra § III. 
16. See Fox, Remedies, supra note 14, at 580 (recognizing that effective enforcement by 
every antitrust jurisdiction would be better than the United States unilaterally strengthening its 
own enforcement efforts for global benefit). But see generally Dodge, supra note 2 (arguing 
that, due to the complexity of multilateral conflict-of-law approaches weighing foreign interests, 
US courts should only employ Alcoa’s US-centric effects doctrine to encourage growth of 
international antitrust law so long as all courts similarly apply such unilateral approaches); Harry 
First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International Competition 
Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711 (2001) (drawing on the US prosecution of the Vitamins Case cartel 
to show that aggressive US extraterritoriality can lead to comprehensive international antitrust 
enforcement). 
Others have proposed ideas for multilateral international antitrust enforcement, including 
a proposal from a group of antitrust scholars (the Munich Group) that involves the creation of 
an international agency tasked with enforcing a globally adopted antitrust code. See Int’l 
Antitrust Code Working Grp., Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATTMTO-Plurilateral 
Trade Agreement, 5 WORLD TRADE MATERIALS 126 (1993) [hereinafter DIAC] (proposing the 
establishment of an international antitrust agency sharing the responsibility of enforcement of 
an international antitrust code with national governments); Wolfgang Fikentscher, On the 
Proposed International Antitrust Code, in ANTITRUST: A NEW INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
REMEDY? 345-47 (John O. Haley & Hiroshi Iyori eds., 1995) (describing the code by one of its 
drafters). The DIAC addresses private redress in a similar fashion to EU law: mandating that 
national governments provide for certain remedies, though ultimately allowing each signatory 
to determine the appropriate parties to seek remedial action. See DIAC, supra note 16, at 180-
81 (addressing “Remedies” under Article 15 to include redressing private harm but stopping 
short of creating a private right of action); see also infra § II.B (summarizing the EC Directive). 
However, because such an international code is not yet a practical reality, this Note will focus 
on how US jurisprudence should operate in absence of international law to create a suitable 
environment for the growth of international private redress. For more information on the DIAC 
or other supranational antitrust law, see Steven L. Snell, Controlling Restrictive Business 
Practices in Global Markets: Reflections on the Concepts of Sovereignty, Fairness, and Comity, 
33 STAN. J. INT’L L. 215, 221-235 (1997) (discussing the search for international consensus on 
antitrust law, including the DIAC); Ulrich Immenga, Export Cartels and Voluntary Export 
Restraints Between Trade and Competition Policy, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 93, 150-51 (1995) 
(introducing the recommendation for the DIAC); see generally Wood, supra note 1 (examining 
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Worldwide jurisdictions are increasingly recognizing the importance 
of private rights of action to enforcement efforts.17 Within the past ten 
years several countries have expanded private parties’ ability to recover 
harm from unlawful anticompetitive behavior by allowing collective 
action.18 However, private actions remain rare in many developing 
antitrust jurisdictions with little, if any, precedent establishing the basis 
for compensatory damages or discovery.19 
In response to international criticism of the statute’s unbridled 
transnational application, the United States has curtailed the Sherman 
Act’s reach both judicially and legislatively.20 Judicially, courts looked 
to international comity, the practice of taking into account the interests 
of other nations.21 The Ninth Circuit was the first court to invoke 
                                                                                                                       
efforts and difficulties in establishing an international antitrust code); Mark R. Joelson & Joseph 
P. Griffin, International Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices Engaged in by 
Transnational Enterprises: A Prognosis, 11 INT’L LAW. 5 (1977) (advocating for an 
international convention as the most effective means of curtailing restrictive business practices 
engaged in by transnational enterprises while detailing challenges and past attempts). 
17. See infra § II.B. See also Cavanagh, Lessons, supra note 8, at 629-30 (highlighting 
that while private remedy in the United States has been under siege in federal courts, the rest of 
the world has been contemplating the adoption of the private right of action); Pheasant, supra 
note 11, at 59 (noting that the 2004 Ashurst Study authorized by the EC recognized that 
importance of private enforcement of EU competition laws due to insufficient resources at the 
EC and EU Member States’ national competition authorities). But see Rajabiun, supra note 7, 
at 190-91 (detailing resistance to private enforcement, particularly in civil law countries and 
those with small economies). 
18. See, e.g., Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15 (Eng.) [hereinafter CRA 2015] (providing 
procedures to make it easier for groups of purchasers to seek compensation in UK courts from 
firms that have fixed prices and formed cartels); Class Actions Law, 5766-2006, SH No. 2054 
p. 264 (Isr.) [hereinafter Class Actions Law] (prescribing uniform rules on the submission and 
conduct of class actions with the object to improve the protection of rights granted under Israeli 
law, including Israel’s antitrust law); Neil Hodge, Class Actions: The Consumer Rights Act, 
INT’L BAR ASS’N (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?
ArticleUid=6cb4718f-9845-4d8d-8a1f-e571fbdd4b56 [https://perma.cc/2UU3-N8FK] 
(archived Oct. 26, 2017) (describing class action structures around the world). See also § II.B. 
19. See Ilene Knable Gotts, Editor’s Preface, in THE PRIVATE COMPETITION 
ENFORCEMENT REVIEW vii (6th ed. 2013) (identifying Lithuania, Romania, Switzerland, and 
Venezuela as countries with a dearth of private antitrust litigation); supra note 11. See also infra 
§ II.B. 
20. Griffin, supra note 15, at 160-62 (discussing measures taken by US courts and 
legislature to correct the Sherman Act’s jurisdictional overreaching); Popofsky, supra note 15, 
at 2423-28 (describing the judicial and congressional response to the international controversy 
over US antitrust law extraterritoriality). 
21. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (“[Comity] is the recognition which one 
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, 
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens 
or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.”); BREYER, supra note 7, at 96 
(introducing various conflict-of-law doctrine); Dan E. Stigall, International Law and Limitations 
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international comity in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 
N.T. & S.A., which used an interest-balancing test to determine whether 
exercising jurisdiction was proper.22 Legislatively, Congress enacted 
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (“FTAIA”), 
which attempts to delimit and define the cross-border reach of US 
antitrust laws by introducing an objective test under the effects 
doctrine.23 Powerful arguments can be advanced in the American 
interest for applying US antitrust laws beyond US borders, including 
adequately protecting American competition and consumers, deterring 
inimical foreign anticompetitive behavior affecting the United States, 
especially in an increasingly globalized economy, and providing 
remedial measures to US victims of such conduct.24 However, these 
interests in providing protection and redress are counterbalanced by 
equally important rationales for limiting the extraterritorial span of US 
                                                                                                                       
on the Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 323, 335-36 (2012) (detailing the use of comity in limiting extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in international law). See infra §§ III, IV. 
22. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). See infra § III. 
The American federal judicial system, which has exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising 
from the Sherman Act, is structured into three tiers: district courts are courts of first instance, 
circuit courts generally provide appellate review of district court decisions, and finally the 
United States Supreme Court issues final appellate review, often to resolve conflicting legal 
conclusions that arise between circuit courts. See HOWARD M. ERICHSON, INSIDE CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: WHAT MATTERS AND WHY 224-27 (2d ed. 2012) (explaining generally the US 
federal court system). There are thirteen circuit courts, which are either geographically restricted 
by the district court from which they take appeals and designated by a number from one through 
eleven, or are assigned appeals based on the specialized categories of disputes. Id. at 4, 224 
(describing US court of appeals). While Supreme Court decisions are binding on all lower courts, 
which include circuit courts, circuit court decisions are binding only on appellate panels within 
the circuit and lower courts below them, though the decisions may be used as persuasive 
authority for all others. Amy E. Sloan, If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Join ‘Em: A Pragmatic Approach 
to Nonprecedential Opinions in the Federal Appellate Courts, 86 NEB. L. REV. 895, 916-17 
(2008) (summarizing the hierarchy of precedent in the US federal court system with footnoted 
exceptions); Charles A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1143, 1179ff (2006) 
(explicating the precedential effect of federal appellate court opinions). District court decisions 
have no precedential weight. See Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 
1371 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that “there is no such thing as ‘the law of the district,” in that federal 
district court decisions do not bind subsequent cases); Sullivan, supra note 22, at 1179 
(explaining that district court opinions are not set precedent for later cases). 
23. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982) (statute limiting extraterritorial applicability of the Sherman 
Act); see infra § III. It is important to observe that this Note discusses jurisdictional issues with 
respect to the FTAIA liberally, though it is recognized that according to recent appellate 
decisions, such as the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Minn-Chem, the FTAIA’s jurisdictional 
impact may exist as a substantive element for a claim rather than a procedural issue of whether 
a US court has the authority to adjudicate a claim. See infra note 36. 
24. See infra § II.B. 
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antitrust law, such as costly overregulation, avoiding international 
disputes, allowing nascent worldwide antitrust regimes to develop to 
beget increased antitrust enforcement, and avoiding harmful 
interference with antitrust regulators’ amnesty programs.25 
The aforementioned responses to these competing concerns have 
been ambiguous, inconsistent, and over-inclusive or under-inclusive.26 
In particular, the poorly worded FTAIA has created more problems 
than it has solved, including inconsistent holdings, wrongly decided 
cases, and disagreements among the circuit courts over interpreting the 
statute’s language.27 The most recent interpretational difficulty 
involves determining what constitutes a “direct” domestic effect under 
the FTAIA. Some courts have held that “direct” takes on a broader 
meaning, where conduct causing domestic effect need only be an 
“immediate consequence.”28 In comparison, other courts have 
narrowly interpreted the statute’s “direct” domestic effect requirement 
as calling for “a reasonably proximate causal nexus,” drawing from tort 
law to exclude an injury that is too remote from the injury’s cause.29 
                                                                                                                       
25. See infra § III. 
26. See infra §§ III, IV. 
27. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Empagran, three federal circuit courts 
interpreted the FTAIA in three different ways. See Thomas Köster & H. Harrison Wheeler, 
Appellate Courts Split on the Interpretation of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: 
Should the Floodgates Be Opened, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 717, 719-25 (2004) 
(describing the circuit split); Diamond, supra note 12, at 805-06 (same). After Empagran, the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits disagreed on interpretation of the statute. See infra § IV. See also 
Diamond, supra note 12, at 819 (“Why were there so many different interpretations of the 
FTAIA? It is widely considered to be a poorly drafted statute, full of ‘double negatives, triple 
negatives, carve-ins and carve-outs and a proviso that is an exception to one of the exceptions,’ 
and even its legislative history is contradictory.”) (quoting John H. Shenefield, Attorney, 
Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Remarks at the N.Y. State Bar Ass’n 2005 Antitrust Law Section 
Symposium: Empagran and the International Reach of U.S. Antitrust Laws (Jan. 27, 2005)) ; 
Waller, Courtroom, supra note 7, at 524-25 (“The courts do not understand the FTAIA. Almost 
all of the opinions are simply wrong or they reach the right result for the wrong reason. As a 
result, the courts are botching the Congressional purpose underlying the statute and 
misconstruing the proper role of antitrust in foreign commerce cases, particularly global cartel 
cases.”). 
28. See United States v. Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 758-59 (9th Cir. 2015) (relying on Ninth 
Circuit precedent that a “direct” effect as contemplated by the FTAIA is a domestic effect that 
“follows as an immediate consequence of the defendant[s’] activity.”); United States v. LSL 
Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004) (drawing interpretation of the FTAIA’s “direct . . . 
effect” requirement from the US Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act’s “direct effect” term declared in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 
U.S. 607, 618 (1992)). 
29. See Lotes, 753 F.3d at 410-11 (citing Minn-Chem to reject the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the FTAIA’s “direct . . . effect” requirement as drawing from an inappropriate 
similarity with another US statute); Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 856-57 (adopting the interpretation 
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The most recent appellate decision involving the FTAIA, Motorola 
Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., has contributed to the statute’s 
confusion.30  There, the Seventh Circuit held that a US parent company 
failed to show that it suffered direct injury as a result of foreign 
anticompetitive conduct, despite the fact that price-fixed component 
products were purchased by its majority-owned foreign subsidiaries to 
be incorporated into final products purchased by the US parent and sold 
to US customers.31 
Nevertheless, various delineations already exist that suggest a 
solution to the inconsistency is attainable and may be designed to 
enhance global antitrust enforcement through greater availability of 
worldwide private redress. What is apparent from the succession of 
decisions from Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California32 to F. 
Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (Empagran)33 is that the 
FTAIA grey area has been sufficiently tapered to allow for the return 
of a comity balancing test to appropriately reconcile the conflicting 
interests at hand in the residual universe of cases.34 This Note argues 
that Hartford Fire, its progeny, and Empagran form confining 
parameters on the applicability of the FTAIA, namely that cases that 
do not involve a US party, domestic effect, and domestic injury arising 
from that effect will fail the FTAIA’s exemption test. Moreover, 
because the FTAIA’s “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” 
effect test can be construed as a proxy for the United States’ 
prescriptive jurisdiction interest, comity analysis is helpful in its 
                                                                                                                       
of “direct” in the FTAIA proposed by the US Department of Justice as being more consistent 
with the language of the statute than the Ninth Circuit’s competing interpretations). 
30. 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015). This Note 
recognizes that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European 
Community may have implications for extraterritorial application of US antitrust laws by noting 
that the private right to action in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act 
(“RICO”) was modeled after US antitrust law’s private right of action in Section 4 of the Clayton 
Act before holding that RICO’s private right of action requires domestic injury. See 136 S. Ct. 
2090, 2111 (2016); supra note 7. However, because the decision ultimately decided a question 
connected with RICO and because the Supreme Court to date has refrained from hearing cases 
related to antitrust extraterritoriality after Empagran, this Note does not provide commentary on 
RJR Nabisco.  See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015) 
(declining to take the Motorola Mobility appeal from the Seventh Circuit); infra § III.B.3. 
31. Id. 
32. 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
33. 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
34. See infra § V. 
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interpretation.35 Thus, claims which are based on exclusively non-US 
conduct that questionably has a “direct effect” on US commerce 
resulting in the plaintiff’s injury are more properly decided not by the 
courts’ current focus on statutory interpretation, but rather by a 
Timberlane-style ad hoc fact-intensive balancing test that contemplates 
factors more suitable to the modern global economy and promoting 
international dialogue.36 
In sum, this Note proposes the introduction of a new international 
comity balancing test into US antitrust jurisprudence with the aim of 
fostering and strengthening global antitrust enforcement and private 
redress. It does so in four parts. Following this introduction, Part II 
briefly summarizes the expansion of US antitrust extraterritorial 
application. Next, Part III discusses various developments undertaken 
to limit and demarcate the reach of US antitrust law. Part IV raises 
issues arising from those efforts that have resulted in inconsistent and 
questionable holdings. Finally in Part V, by analyzing and synthesizing 
the existing precedent, this Note contends that a judicial international 
comity balancing test would most appropriately determine the 
propriety of US antitrust extraterritoriality for particular types of 
private recompense cases that are problematic under the current 
framework. 
                                                                                                                       
35. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164-65 (asserting while construing the FTAIA that the rule 
of construing ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority 
of other nations as a principle of customary international law “assumes that legislators take 
account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they write American laws . . 
. [which] helps the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together in harmony – 
a harmony particularly needed in today’s highly interdependent commercial world.”); Motorola 
Mobility, 775 F.3d at 818 (“[The FTAIA] has been interpreted, for reasons of international 
comity . . . , to limit the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law.”); Japan Motorola Brief, 
supra note 3, at 4-5 (“The [FTAIA] was intended to prevent such ‘unreasonable interference 
with the sovereign authority of other nations.’” (citing Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164)). 
36. It should be noted that this Note does not consider procedural issues associated with 
extraterritoriality such as personal jurisdiction, venue, and forum non conveniens. Additionally, 
it does not discuss whether the FTAIA, properly understood, addresses the question of courts’ 
subject matter jurisdiction or, alternatively, whether it spells out a prima facie element in an 
antitrust claim. See Lotes, 753 F.3d at 398 (“We hold that . . . the requirements of the FTAIA 
are substantive and non-jurisdictional in nature. Because Congress has not ‘clearly state[d]’ . . . 
that these requirements are jurisdictional, they go to the merits of the claim rather than the 
adjudicative power of the court.”); Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 851-53 (establishing that FTAIA 
addresses “conduct” to which the Sherman Act applies and thus refers to the element of a claim 
rather than subject-matter jurisdiction). 
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II. THE SHERMAN ACT’S EXTRATERRITORIAL EXPANSION 
The narrative of the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial evolution 
begins with American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., where Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes’ opinion initially established strict territoriality 
for the question of whether the statute governed foreign conduct.37 
Deciding whether an American plaintiff was entitled to redress for 
anticompetitive conduct and resulting injury that occurred entirely 
outside of the United States, Holmes observed that “the general and 
almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful 
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is 
done.”38 Holmes’ analysis embodied a tension inherent in prescriptive 
jurisdiction between a state’s authority to have absolute and exclusive 
jurisdiction within its territory and a state’s authority to protect its 
citizens from harmful external conduct undertaken abroad.39 The 
former precept is known as the “territorial principle,” whereas the latter 
reflects its objective application, otherwise known as “objective 
territoriality.”40 In direct opposition to the territorial principle, 
objective territoriality dictates that “one state may share concurrent 
jurisdiction with another state.”41 
                                                                                                                       
37. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). In American Banana, a US plaintiff brought suit under the 
Sherman Act to recover from a defendant who had allegedly influenced a foreign government 
to seize plaintiff’s properties. 
38. Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 355-56 (distinguishing instances where harmful conduct 
occurs in regions subject to no sovereign, such as piracy on the high seas, where extraterritorial 
application of domestic laws would be proper). 
39. Prescriptive jurisdiction, also known as legislative jurisdiction, refers to the authority 
of a state to make its law applicable to persons or activities. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing legislative jurisdiction, or “jurisdiction to prescribe”); 
Popofsky, supra note 15, at 2418 (defining prescriptive jurisdiction as “the scope of a state’s 
power to regulate conduct.”). International law traditionally recognizes four predicates of 
prescriptive jurisdiction: (1) territorial principle – jurisdiction over all conduct within the 
prescribing state’s territory; (2) nationality principle – jurisdiction over all conduct of the 
prescribing state’s citizenry, including conduct beyond the state’s borders; (3) protective 
principle – jurisdiction over external conduct directed at the prescribing state’s security or the 
interests; and (4) universality principle – jurisdiction over universally condemned conduct as a 
matter of public international law, such as piracy or slave trade. See BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED 
STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 82 (2d 
ed. Supp. 1993) (expounding the concept of prescriptive jurisdiction). 
40. See Popofsky, supra note 15, at 2418-20 (discussing the bases for prescriptive 
jurisdiction); Dodge, supra note 2, at 130 (same). 
41. Popofsky, supra note 15, at 2419 (explaining the difference between the territorial 
principle and its objective application) (emphasis in original); see also Laker Airways, 731 F.2d 
at 922-23 (discussing the objective application of territorial jurisdiction as being entirely 
consistent with internationally recognized limits on sovereign authority). 
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While the court decided this tension in favor of finding 
jurisdiction based on pure territoriality, it faced a question of whether 
a US plaintiff harmed abroad by foreign conduct arguably taken at the 
behest of a foreign sovereign suffered a cognizable injury under the 
Sherman Act. Decisions immediately following American Banana, 
however, began to stretch the reach of pure territoriality jurisdiction to 
foreign conduct so long as there existed some substantial in-US 
conduct to serve as a predicate for the Sherman Act’s applicability.42 
When globalization began to develop in the 1920s, national interest 
pressures on doctrine started to mount as the international cartel 
movement complicated relationships across borders.43 
A. Alcoa and the Effects Doctrine 
Legal doctrine undergirding extraterritorial application of the 
Sherman Act was fundamentally altered by Judge Learned Hand’s 
1945 opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa).44 
                                                                                                                       
42. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) (finding that the 
Sherman Act applied to an illegal agreement executed in England to divide world markets that 
kept an American firm out of the British market and a British firm out of the American market); 
United States v. Pac. & Artic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913) (rejecting the argument 
that the Sherman Act was inapplicable to transportation routes between the United States and 
Canada on the grounds that the conduct occurred partially within the United States); see also 
Popofksy, supra note 15, at 2420-21 (detailing reactions and cases following American Banana). 
43. See Diamond, supra note 12, at 811 (narrating the growth of globalization and the 
international cartel movement in the early part of the twentieth century); Jeremy C. Bates, 
Comment, Home Is Where the Hurt Is: Forum Non Conveniens and Antitrust, 2000 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 281, 317 (2000) (demonstrating that US national interest shaped the doctrine 
underlying the applicability of US antitrust law during growth of globalization in the early 
twentieth century); see also RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: 
HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 75-89 (rev. ed. 1996) (discussing the cooperative competition 
movement and the rise of encouraged trade associations during the 1920s). 
44. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see also Snell, supra note 16, at 246-47 (explaining that 
Alcoa forced reconsideration of traditional notions of national sovereignty by expanding the 
concept of territory). Of note, during a time in which cases involving the Sherman Act were 
appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court, the case was referred to the Second Circuit 
after four Supreme Court justices recused themselves. PERITZ, supra note 43, at 363 n.128 
(recounting the circumstances leading to the Second Circuit hearing and deciding Alcoa); James 
M. Anderson, Eric Helland & Merritt McAlister, Measuring How Stock Ownership Affects 
Which Judges and Justices Hear Cases, 103 GEO. L.J. 1163, 1176 n.76 (2015) (same). The 
Supreme Court later explicitly approved the decision in Am. Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 
781 (1946). 1 SPENCER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 6-12 
n.12 (3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter WALLER, AMERICAN BUSINESS] (noting that the Supreme Court 
in Am. Tobacco observed that Alcoa “was decided . . . under unique circumstances which add to 
its weight as a precedent.”); PERITZ, supra note 43, at 363 n.128 (explaining that when approving 
Alcoa the Supreme Court cited extensive passages from Alcoa in its Am. Tobacco decision). 
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By the time the Second Circuit heard Alcoa, objective territoriality 
doctrinally began to realize widespread acceptance, due in part to the 
utility of the Sherman Act in thwarting enemy misconduct in US 
wartime industry during both World Wars.45 In deciding the case, 
Judge Learned Hand recognized the question facing the Second Circuit 
in Alcoa was manifestly different from the question analyzed by Justice 
Holmes.46 Specifically, Alcoa involved Alcoa’s Canadian subsidiary 
participating in an international cartel on Alcoa’s behalf to fix 
aluminum prices worldwide, but where none of the conduct occurred 
within US boundaries.47 Accepting Holmes’ axiom from American 
Banana that courts “should not impute to Congress an intent to punish 
all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences 
within the United States,” Hand distinguished cases with conduct that 
intended substantial effects in the United States.48 Hand observed that 
“it is settled law . . . that any state may impose liabilities, even upon 
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that 
has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and 
these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize.”49 The court 
accordingly held that when conduct causes an intended effect on US 
commerce, such conduct is within the Sherman Act’s regulatory 
grasp.50 
Alcoa thus launched objective territoriality via the effects doctrine 
into US antitrust jurisprudence and began an era of aggressive 
extraterritorial enforcement.51 The effects doctrine articulated by Alcoa 
                                                                                                                       
45. See Popofsky, supra note 15, at 2421 (chronicling the events leading up to Alcoa, 
particularly during the Second World War); Richard M. Steuer & Peter A. Barile III, Antitrust 
in Wartime, 16 ANTITRUST 71, 71-73 (2002) (same); First, supra note 16, at 728-30 (same); 
Thomas K. Fisher, Antitrust During National Emergencies, 40 MICH. L. REV. 969, 988-89 
(1942) (describing the use of antitrust enforcement during World War One). 
46. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443-44 (elaborating on the distinction between American Banana’s 
territorial doctrine and the facts at hand in Alcoa); Popofsky, supra note 15, at 2422 
(summarizing Judge Hand’s approach to framing the question in Alcoa). 
47. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 421-22, 442-43 (discussing the nature of the anticompetitive 
conduct in the dispute). 
48. Id. at 443-44 (highlighting that the domestic US effect intended by defendant’s foreign 
conduct removed it from the auspices of American Banana and drew similarity to subsequent 
cases, such as Pacific & Artic and United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927)). 
49. Id. at 443. 
50. See id. at 443-44 (establishing that conduct intending to affect US imports stood as 
sufficient reason to apply US law to cross-border conduct). 
51. See, e.g., Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (holding that a lower court should not 
have refused to exercise Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign reinsurers under principles of 
international comity because foreign law was not in direct conflict with US law); Pfizer, 434 
U.S. 308 (1978) (concluding that a foreign nation is a “person” under Section 4 of the Clayton 
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and its progeny establishes national jurisdiction over conduct that has 
an intentional or foreseeable effect on the nation’s commerce where the 
effect is substantial.52 Subsequent cases expanded on the application of 
the effects doctrine, including questions regarding segmenting 
conspiracies by location of the injury and the nationality of the 
plaintiffs.53 The former question was decided in Continental Ore Co. v. 
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., in which the Court found that a 
domestic plaintiff was entitled to combine claims of domestic and 
foreign injury so long as they were part of the same conspiracy.54 
Specifically, the Court held that “the character and effect of a 
conspiracy are not to be judged by dismembering it and viewing its 
separate parts, but only by looking at it as a whole.”55 
With respect to foreign plaintiffs, the Supreme Court opined in 
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India that though American consumers 
are the main object of the Sherman Act’s protection, US antitrust law 
also entitles foreign parties to seek redress for antitrust injury because 
“foreigners who have been victimized by antitrust violations clearly 
                                                                                                                       
Act and thus entitled to sue for treble damages under the antitrust laws to the same extent as any 
other plaintiff); Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (finding 
in part that a conspiracy to monopolize or restrain domestic or foreign commerce of the United 
States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of the conspiracy is 
conducted in foreign countries); United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1 (1st 
Cir. 1997) (holding that cartel activities committed abroad that have a substantial and intended 
effect within the United States may form the basis for criminal prosecution under the Sherman 
Act); see also Wood, supra note 1, at 298 (attributing aggressive extraterritorial enforcement to 
a number of factors, including increased global business activity, the economic and political 
dominance of the United States, American acceptance of the effects doctrine, and lack of 
international machinery to address genuine transnational competition problems). 
52. See MARK R. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER: A GUIDE TO THE 
OPERATION OF UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN UNION AND OTHER KEY COMPETITION LAWS IN 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 44 (3d ed. 2006) (describing the implications of the effects doctrine); 
Snell, supra note 16, at 246-47 (same). 
53. See generally Cont’l Ore Co., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (holding that the character and 
effect of a price-fixing conspiracy should be judged as a whole and not dismembered and viewed 
in separate parts); Pfizer, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) (holding that a foreign nation had standing to sue 
for treble damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act). 
54. 370 U.S. at 704 (“A conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign 
commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of 
the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries.”). As will be later discussed, the Court 
did an about-face on this question when deciding Empagran by interpreting the FTAIA through 
comity principles. See infra §§ III, IV. 
55. Cont’l Ore Co., 370 U.S. at 699 (quoting United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 544 
(1913)). 
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may contribute to the protection of American consumers.”56 While the 
main question decided by Pfizer was whether a foreign sovereign was 
a “person” as contemplated by the Clayton Act and thus entitled to seek 
redress for harmful anticompetitive conduct, the decision has been 
understood as affording foreign purchasers the protection of US 
antitrust laws when harmed by US conduct.57 Subsequent lower court 
opinions have followed the Supreme Court’s observation, also noting 
that foreign parties relying on US laws to transact with American 
parties are entitled to the protection of those laws.58 
The effects doctrine continued to be embraced in US courts 
through the 1990s, notably in the Supreme Court’s decision of Hartford 
Fire and in the First Circuit’s United States v. Nippon Paper Industries 
Co., Ltd., in which the doctrine was applied in a criminal action.59 In 
Hartford Fire, US plaintiffs alleged boycott conspiracies in the US 
reinsurance market between American and British conspirators.60 
Noting that “it is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies 
to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce 
some substantial effect in the United States,” the Supreme Court 
shrugged off an international comity defense and held that the British 
defendants were properly subject to the Sherman Act.61 
                                                                                                                       
56. 434 U.S. at 314 (assessing the authority of foreign purchasers to recover treble 
damages from an American defendant under Section 4 of the Clayton Act for Sherman Act 
violations affecting foreign countries). 
57. Id. at 311-12 (describing the legal issue on appeal); WALLER, AMERICAN BUSINESS, 
supra note 44, at 9-34-9-35 (discussing arguments for Pfizer supporting “the proposition that 
the Sherman Act condemns restraints imposed by American firms from the United States on 
foreign consumers.”); Salil K. Mehra, Deterrence: The Private Remedy and International 
Antitrust Cases, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275, 297, 297 n.88 (2002) (“Both the sponsor of 
the FTAIA and commentators on the bill understood that the bill did not reject Pfizer or its 
endorsement of standing for foreign parties under federal antitrust laws.”); see also Foreign 
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 2326 Before the Subcommittee on 
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 111, 113 (1981) 
(statement of Martin F. Connor, Washington Corporate Counsel, General Electric Co.) 
[hereinafter 1981 FTAIA Hearings] (including statement of Business Roundtable to the effect 
that the bill containing the FTAIA was not a substitute for legislation to modify Pfizer that was 
being considered simultaneously). 
58. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 943 (observing that as a foreign corporation operating 
within the United States plaintiff is entitled to the protection of US antitrust laws); Transor 
(Bermuda), Ltd. v. BP North American Petroleum, 666 F. Supp. 581, 584-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(following Pfizer to hold that Bermudian victims of anticompetitive behavior affecting a 
primarily US market have standing to assert US antitrust claims). 
59. 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997). 
60. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 773-78 (recounting the facts of the case). 
61. Id. at 796 (citing prior holdings by the court that subjected defendants to US 
competition scrutiny where there were substantial intended effects on US commerce: Matsushita 
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In the Nippon Paper case, the United States Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) charged Nippon Paper with entering into a price-fixing 
agreement with other thermal fax competitors in Japan to raise the price 
of the paper exported to the United States.62 Nippon Paper was accused 
of having sold thermal fax paper to two trading companies in Japan for 
export to the United States, but none of the conduct was alleged to have 
occurred in the United States. Refusing to distinguish between civil and 
criminal cases, the First Circuit followed Hartford Fire’s reaffirmation 
of the effects doctrine and held that the Sherman Act applies to wholly 
foreign conduct that has an intended and substantial effect in the United 
States.63 By adopting the Supreme Court’s approach in Hartford Fire, 
Nippon Paper was believed to have cemented the effects doctrine as 
the controlling test for Sherman Act extraterritoriality.64 
B. Reasons to Extend the Sherman Act Abroad 
In part, the United States’ adoption of the effects doctrine and the 
extraterritorial expansion of Sherman Act applicability was a protective 
                                                                                                                       
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986); Cont’l Ore Co., 370 U.S. 
at 704; Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952); Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. at 
275-76; Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444). 
62. See Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 2 (relaying the factual account from the indictment). 
63. Id. at 4 (establishing that the effects doctrine applies both to civil and criminal 
scenarios due to section one of the Sherman Act’s undiscerning language). Two years after 
Nippon Paper, Japan and the United States would sign the Agreement Between the Government 
of the United States and the Government of Japan Concerning Cooperation in Anticompetitive 
Activities to address enforcement coordination and international comity. See generally 
Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan 
Concerning Cooperation in Anticompetitive Activities, Oct. 7, 1999, U.S.-Japan, 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/agreement-between-government-united-states-america-and-
government-japan-concerning-cooperation [https://perma.cc/32UG-GAQY] (last visited Oct. 
26, 2017) (antitrust cooperation agreement between the United States and Japan noting that “the 
sound and effective enforcement of competition laws of each country would be enhanced by 
cooperation and, where appropriate, coordination between the Parties in the application of those 
laws”). For more detailed information on the bilateral agreement and the surrounding 
circumstances, see generally Cooper, supra note 6 (analyzing the antitrust cooperation 
agreement between the two countries). See infra § III.A.2. 
64. See, e.g., First, supra note 16, at 723 (“[Nippon Paper] is more appropriately viewed 
as one that actually closes a chapter on the territorial controversies of the last three decades of 
antitrust law . . . [and] confirms that we have now moved to a general acceptance of what had 
previously been labeled ‘extraterritorial’ jurisdiction.”). See also Spencer Weber Waller, The 
Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563, 569 (2000) [hereinafter Waller, Twilight] 
(explaining that Hartford Fire “virtually eliminated” international comity as a meaningful 
restraint on the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act). 
2017] INTERNATIONAL COMITY BALANCING TEST 245 
measure.65 As global enterprise became the new norm for national 
economies, an international mechanism was needed to address genuine 
transnational competition problems.66 Because national antitrust laws 
partly exist to protect domestic markets and consumers, proponents of 
extraterritoriality argue that the law must then apply to those causing 
domestic harm externally in order to adequately serve that purpose.67 
Globally, major antitrust jurisdictions have agreed protection is 
best attained through cross-border application of domestic laws. The 
EC established extraterritorial application of the EEC Treaty Article 85 
(now TFEU 101), Sherman Act Section 1’s counterpart, in its 1988 
Woodpulp decision.68 There, the EC decided it was necessary to extend 
jurisdiction over a cartel of producers located outside the European 
Union to avoid affording offenders of EU competition law “an easy 
means of evading those prohibitions.”69 Apart from the United States 
and the European Union, a number of other jurisdictions have also 
                                                                                                                       
65. See Eleanor Fox, Witness Statement Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, 
Hearings on International Antitrust Issues 2 (Feb. 15, 2006), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/
commission_hearings/pdf/Statement_Fox_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/M88U-68G6] (archived 
Oct. 26, 2017) [hereinafter Fox, AMC Hearing] (stating that most antitrust jurisdictions have 
adopted some form of the effects doctrine to protect themselves, the absence of which would 
necessitate an international antitrust regime); see also Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd v Comm’n, 
1999 E.C.R. II-0753 (embracing the effects doctrine in the EU by stating that the application of 
EU regulations to a merger between companies located outside EU territory “is justified under 
public international law when it is foreseeable that a proposed concentration will have an 
immediate and substantial effect in the Community.”). 
66. See Wood, supra note 1, at 298 (explaining that US adoption of the effects doctrine 
was borne out of increasing transnational business activity); John A. Trenor, Jurisdiction and 
the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583, 
1600 (1995) (stating that American Banana’s standard of strict territoriality grew increasingly 
unacceptable given the rise of internationalized markets); see also Joelson & Griffin, supra note 
16, at 16-17 (highlighting that an international mechanism governing transnational enterprises 
does not yet exist in part due to differences in national policies concerned with protecting 
domestic markets and industry). 
67. See, e.g., Brief for Economists Joseph E. Stiglitz and Peter R. Orszag as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 2, F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) 
(No. 03-724) [hereinafter Stiglitz & Orszag Brief] (arguing that extraterritorial application of 
the Sherman Act in private litigation helps protect American consumers against the potential 
harms of international cartels); Trenor, supra note 66, at 1600 (“However, the application of 
[strict territoriality in American Banana] failed to further the central policy behind antitrust laws: 
protecting US markets from anticompetitive behavior.”). 
68. Case C-89/85, Ahlström Osakeyhtiö & Ors v. Comm’n (Woodpulp), 1988 E.C.R. 5193 
(establishing the effects doctrine in the EU); Gencor, 1999 E.C.R. II-0753 (following 
Woodpulp); First, supra note 16, at 726 (discussing the EC’s extraterritorial extension of EU 
competition law beginning with Woodpulp). 
69. See Woodpulp, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, ¶ 16 (observing that restricting Article 85 to conduct 
occurring within the EU would afford offenders “an easy means of evading those prohibitions.”). 
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extended the reach of their own antitrust laws, including Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and 
Switzerland.70 
Protection under antitrust law is principally realized through 
deterrence and redress objectives.71 Deterring anticompetitive conduct 
is achieved through criminalizing conduct and allowing for the 
recovery of treble damages in private litigation.72 In regard to private 
litigation, supporters of extraterritorial application highlight the 
powerful deterrent effect of treble damage recovery in removing the 
ability of international cartelists to subsidize US operations through 
foreign cartel profits even in the face of domestic liability.73 
                                                                                                                       
70. HAWK, supra note 39, at 87-88 (listing countries that have accepted some variation of 
the effects doctrine as a basis of antitrust jurisdiction); Waller, Twilight, supra note 64, at 574-
75 (discussing other countries that have undertaken cross-border application of national antitrust 
laws); John Terzaken, Antitrust Enforcement Goes Global, REUTERS (Nov. 22, 2013), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/11/22/antitrust-enforcement-goes-global 
[https://perma.cc/D73R-VY5R] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (noting countries engaged in 
extraterritorial anti-cartel prosecutions). 
71. See Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 314 (noting that allowing private parties to sue under US 
antitrust law to recover harm threefold serves two purposes: “to deter violators and deprive them 
of ‘the fruits of their illegality,’ and ‘to compensate victims of antitrust violations for their 
injuries.’”); Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, Report and Recommendations 241-42 (Apr. 
2007), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/toc.htm [https://perma.cc/
TT9K-52QP] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (describing US antitrust law’s public-private 
enforcement framework); see generally Stiglitz & Orszag Brief, supra note 67 (arguing that 
deterrence achieved through broader US antitrust jurisdiction best protects American consumers 
from global cartels). 
72. See Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 314-15 (explaining that granting standing to foreign plaintiffs 
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, and with it the availability of treble damages, furthers the 
deterrence purposes of US antitrust law by stripping cartelists of the ability to offset domestic 
liability with illicit gains made in foreign markets); Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 
384, 403 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Pfizer for the proposition that American markets can benefit from 
the additional deterrence associated with allowing plaintiffs to sue for foreign harm caused by 
conduct that negatively affects American markets); Den Norske Stats Olkeselskap AS v. 
HeereMac v.o.f., 241 F.3d 420, 434-35 (5th Cir. 2001) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (opining 
that barring foreign plaintiffs to bring suit in US court for claims arising from global cartel 
conspiracies affecting the United States lessens the deterrent effect of US treble damages); see 
generally Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond & Belinda A. Barnett, Deterrence and 
Detection of Cartels: Using All the Tools and Sanctions, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 207 (2011) 
(evaluating the deterrence mechanisms of American antitrust enforcement). 
73. See Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 435 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the 
importance of deterring global cartel activity by completely depriving cartelists of price-fixing 
benefits for adequate protection of markets). See also Stiglitz & Orszag Brief, supra note 67, at 
6-8 (explaining the need to eliminate a cartel’s expected global profits to effectively deter global 
cartels). 
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Indeed, antitrust regimes outside of the United States are 
increasingly recognizing that effective enforcement is costly and, thus, 
private actions for damages notwithstanding trebling bolsters 
enforcement without greater public expenditure.74 This recognition is 
underscored by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) in its 2001 
Courage v Crehan decision: 
The full effectiveness of Article [101] of the [TFEU] and, in 
particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in 
Article [101(1)] would be put at risk if it were not open to any 
individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract 
or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition. Indeed, the 
existence of such a right strengthens the working of the 
Community competition rules and discourages agreement or 
practices . . . which are liable to restrict or distort competition. 
From that point of view, actions for damages before the national 
courts can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of 
effective competition in the Community.75 
As a result, governments around the globe have increasingly 
initiated or bolstered the ability for private parties to recover from 
harms created by unlawful anticompetitive over the past ten years. The 
ECJ’s sentiments can most readily be associated with the EC’s decision 
in 2014 to issue Directive 2014/104/EU, which required EU member 
states to enact legislation providing for private rights of action at the 
national level within two years of the Directive’s promulgation.76 The 
EC Directive was the culmination of “wide spread support in Europe 
for the principle that legal and natural persons who suffered a loss as a 
                                                                                                                       
74. See Pheasant, supra note 11, at 59 (“In the [EC]’s view, any increase in private 
litigation . . . would serve the purpose of more effective antitrust enforcement without placing 
greater strains on the public purpose); Maria Teresa Vanikiotis, Note, Private Antitrust 
Enforcement and Tentative Steps Toward Collective Redress in Europe and the United Kingdom, 
37 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1639, 1642-43 (2014) (introducing dialogue in the United Kingdom 
and Europe on implementing mechanisms for collective private antitrust redress that indicates 
authorities believe current private enforcement requires strengthening); supra note 17. 
75. Case C-453/99, Courage v Crehan, 2001 E.C.R. I-6297, ¶¶ 26, 27. 
76. See Directive 2014/104/EU (addressing the creation of private rights of action in 
Member States, including prescribed procedural rules, party standing, damages calculations, and 
interaction with the EC’s leniency program); Joaquín Almunia, V.P. of the Eur. Comm’n, 
Fighting Against Cartels: A Priority for the Present and for the Future, Address Before SV 
Kartellrecht (Apr. 3, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-281_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/K43W-SKMN] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (describing generally the EC 
Directive and its effect on overall cartel enforcement). 
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result of an antitrust infringement should be entitled to recover 
damages to compensate them for that loss.”77 
Brazil presents another example of a jurisdiction seeking to have 
an expanded private enforcement regime complement its public 
enforcement efforts.78 In lieu of treble damages or other incentives for 
pursuing private recovery, the Brazil’s Administrative Council of 
Economic Defence (“CADE”) has searched for new and more effective 
ways to encourage victims to claim damages collectively with the 
object to amplify the deterrent effect of CADE’s decisions.79 This has 
involved delivering agency judgments to trade confederations and 
associations so that any interested parties might be notified of the 
potential for pursuing recovery, drafting administrative bylaws that 
allows effective compensation of anticompetitive harms at lower costs 
to the aggrieved parties, and joining private litigation as an amicus 
curiae to provide its view of Brazil’s Competition Law in an effort to 
influence decisions.80 
Other countries have also sought to expand private enforcement 
through expansions of class action-style recovery, such as Israel and 
the United Kingdom.81 In 2006, Israel enacted its Class Actions Law, 
                                                                                                                       
77. Almunia, supra note 76, at 2 (stating that the EC Directive was proposed to reach “out 
to victims of antitrust infringements so that they can obtain compensation for the harm they 
suffered.”); Pheasant, supra note 11, at 59 (introducing the debate preceding the eventual 
adoption of a European private right of action); supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
78. Carlos Francisco de Magalhães, Gabriel Nogueria Dias & Cristiano Rodrigo Del 
Debbio, Brazil, in THE PRIVATE COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT REVIEW 52 (Ilene Knable Gotts 
ed., 6th ed. 2013) (summarizing recent efforts to expand private enforcement in Brazil); Org. for 
Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Latin American and Caribbean Competition Forum – Session I: 
Cartels: Estimation of Harm in Public Enforcement Actions 7 (Mar. 19, 2017), 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/LACF(2017)21/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/U238-
EYGG] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (highlighting that a goal of Brazil’s competition authority has 
been to foster private antitrust damages actions). 
79. De Magalhães et al., supra note 78, at 52 (discussing the Brazilian competition 
authority’s efforts in provoking private litigation as a means of enforcement); CADE Submits 
for Public Consultation Bylaw on Procedures Related to Access to Documents from the Antitrust 
Investigations, ADMIN. COUNCIL FOR ECON. DEF. (Dec. 14, 2016), http://en.cade.gov.br/press-
releases/cade-submits-for-public-consultation-resolution-on-procedures-related-to-the-access-
to-documents-from-the-antitrust-investigations [https://perma.cc/WPH2-7XRS] (archived Oct. 
26, 2017) [hereinafter CADE Press Release] (announcing the submission of an administrative 
bylaw that aims to encourage private follow-on lawsuits to public prosecutions). 
80. De Magalhães et al., supra note 78, at 52 (offering examples of how CADE has spurred 
private parties to pursue litigation in Brazil). CADE Press Release (explaining a proposed bylaw 
that would encourage antitrust victims to seek recovery by lowering administrative fines and 
limiting exposure to private liability for cartelists participating in investigatory efforts in 
addition to facilitating greater access to the fruits of CADE investigations). 
81. See supra note 18. 
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under which private antitrust actions may be brought.82 The statute 
provides for collective recovery for violations of certain laws, 
including antitrust violations, by either a group of private class 
members that raise common substantive questions of fact or law, a 
public authority on behalf of a class, or an organization on behalf of 
class members within the sphere of one of the organization’s public 
purposes.83 As a result, Israel has experienced a sharp increase in 
private antitrust litigation, notably with respect to international 
cartels.84 
The United Kingdom recently enacted the Consumer Rights Act 
2015, which, among other adjustments, makes changes to the 
Competition Act 199885 to facilitate recovery actions by private victims 
of proscribed anticompetitive conduct.86 For instance, the statute 
extends the time purchasers have to bring claims from two years to six 
years.87 In addition, the statute introduces a new type of collective 
action suit that requires class members to “opt out” to complement “opt 
in” actions, the former of which provides greater strength in numbers 
to encourage quick compensatory resolutions.88 
Equally important to effective enforcement is providing relief for 
victims of anticompetitive conduct.89 Remedies for harm created by an 
                                                                                                                       
82. See Class Actions Law, § 1(1) (establishing class action recovery in part for those 
private parties that would find it difficult to seek redress as individuals); David E. Tadmor & 
Shai Bakal, Israel, in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 2017 76 
(Samantha Mobley ed., 2016) (describing class actions in Israel). 
83. Class Actions Law, § 4 (setting forth the persons entitled to petition the court for class 
action approval).  See also Tadmor & Bakal, supra note 82, at 76 (“The Class Actions Law 
provides that a person, public entity, or consumers’ organization may, under certain conditions, 
file a class action on behalf of a class of plaintiffs and seek damages for breach of [Israel’s 
antitrust law].”). 
84. Tadmor & Bakal, supra note 82, at 76 (summarizing the development of private 
antitrust litigation in Israel); Ido Baum, Who Profits from Class Actions Suits? Not You, 
HAARETZ (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/.premium-
1.632671?=&ts=_1502369885185 [https://perma.cc/Q8MC-NB2J] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) 
(following a study that analyzed the increase of class actions suits since the Class Actions Law). 
85. The Competition Act 1998, c. 41 (Eng.) (the UK’s current major source of antitrust 
law). 
86. See CRA 2015, § 81 (setting out modifications to the Competition Act 1998 for private 
actions); see also Hodge, supra note 18 (highlighting changes made by CRA 2015). 
87. See CRA 2015, § 81.8 (outlining changes to limitation and prescriptive periods 
associated with certain types of actions); see also Hodge, supra note 18 (noting the increase in 
the limitation period). 
88. See CRA 2015, § 81.5(11) (defining “Opt-out collective proceedings”); Hodge, supra 
note 18 (detailing ramifications of opt-out actions). 
89. See generally Fox, Remedies, supra note 14 (stressing the global necessity of remedies 
while evaluating how “the law, the quest of competitiveness, and the perceived interests of 
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antitrust violation are needed on both micro and macro levels.90 These 
include restoring a competitive environment, compensating victims, 
correcting the conditions facilitating the anticompetitive behavior, and 
incentivizing adherence to the law.91 While perfect relief is impossible, 
effective relief for purchasers harmed by foreign antitrust perpetrators 
may only be achieved in some cases through extraterritorial application 
of antitrust law.92 Advocates of such measures maintain that the United 
States should not compromise its law on comity grounds just because 
a foreign state’s law may have tolerated or even sanctioned the cartel.93 
III. EFFORTS TO LIMIT THE SHERMAN ACT’S CROSS-BORDER 
APPLICATION 
Though the deterrence and redress achieved through Alcoa’s 
effects doctrine seemingly justify its place in US jurisprudence, the 
doctrine has been subject to three main criticisms.94 First, critics have 
argued that the effects doctrine is contrary to established principles of 
international law, which at the time were firmly based on pure 
                                                                                                                       
nations are creating retrenchment and suboptimal remedies.”); see, e.g., Pheasant, supra note 
11, at 59 (noting that the debate preceding the private right to sue in the EU was led by 
widespread support for compensating private loss); Cavanagh, Lessons, supra note 8, at 631 
(explaining that allowing private actions ensures that victims are fairly compensated because 
public enforcement actions do not provide monetary recovery for individual losses). 
90. Fox, Remedies, supra note 14, at 573 (defining the micro goal as correcting the market 
failure, reestablishing competition, and compensating victims and defining the macro goal as 
structuring incentives to minimize the recurrence of the anticompetitive conduct); Cavanagh, 
Lessons, supra note 8, at 631-36 (describing the remedial objectives of private actions under US 
antitrust law). 
91. Fox, Remedies, supra note 14, at 573 (enumerating the objectives of antitrust 
remedies); Cavanagh, Lessons, supra note 8, at 631-36 (same). 
92. See, e.g., Woodpulp, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, ¶ 16 (noting that if applicability of EU 
competition law was restricted by the territorial confines of the European Community, violators 
could easily evade the established prohibitions); Fox, Remedies, supra note 14, at 581-82 
(arguing that the recent trend in judicial narrowing of US antitrust jurisdiction is at odds with 
the need for stronger remedies). 
93. See Fox, Remedies, supra note 14, at 577 (announcing that the US Supreme Courts’ 
decision in Hartford Fire met the “test of courage of convictions” by applying the Sherman Act 
extraterritorially amid “other nations’ pleas on behalf of ‘their’ firms.”); see, e.g., First, supra 
note 16, at 726 (illustrating that the EC took the same approach in Woodpulp when it decided it 
had jurisdiction over an international cartel that included an American firm exempted from US 
antitrust law). 
94. See HAWK, supra note 399, at 111-12 (describing critique of the effects doctrine). See 
also WALLER, AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 6-22ff (discussing challenges levied by 
foreign governments and commentators accusing Alcoa’s holding of “going beyond both the 
practice of nations and American precedent.”). 
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territoriality.95 Second, critics have pointed out that the effects doctrine 
does not take into account foreign interests.96 The failure to account for 
these interests, critics argue, enables courts to mask the true reasons 
underlying their decisions or to openly slight foreign interests.97 
Finally, critics have complained that Alcoa’s effects test has lacked 
clarity and predictability.98 In particular, lower courts have 
reformulated the test from an intent and effect test to either a direct and 
substantial effect test or have only required fictional general intent.99 
                                                                                                                       
95. See WALLER, AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 6-25 (highlighting that Alcoa’s 
effects test may not have met the normal exception to the general presumption of territoriality 
nor did it follow the recognized principles of comity, which leaves regulation of conduct to the 
state with the primary interest); HAWK, supra note 39, at 111 (conceding that Hand overstated 
the acceptance of the effects doctrine when he announced it as “settled law”). 
Professor Barry Hawk, however, finds this point to be unpersuasive, contending that 
whether Alcoa’s effects test was inconsistent with contemporaneous international law is 
irrelevant because it is now consistent with current state practice and international law. HAWK, 
supra note 39, at 111 (“[W]hether or not the effects doctrine as adopted in Alcoa was consistent 
with international law at the time of the decision in 1945, the effects doctrine as a basis for 
antitrust jurisdiction is consistent with the trend in state practice and today is not contrary to 
international law.”). 
96. WALLER, AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 6-24-6-25 (contending that another 
weakness of Alcoa’s adoption of the effects test was “its perceived failure to take into account 
the possible legitimate interests of other nations affected by an exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.”); HAWK, supra note 39, at 111 (declaring as a more “facially attractive” criticism 
that Hand’s “intent and effect test does not encompass an explicit recognition of foreign 
interests,” nor does it have a doctrinal handle to ensure that those interests may be weighed). 
97. WALLER, AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 6-26 (“To minimize conflict and 
resentment, [foreign interests] ideally should have been brought to bear at the time an antitrust 
court was deciding whether it had jurisdiction to apply United States laws.”); HAWK, supra note 
39, at 111 (stating that Alcoa’s failure to recognize foreign interests lead to the Ninth Circuit’s 
adoption of a “balancing of interests” test in 1976). 
Others, on the other hand, argue that disregarding foreign interests is not only the best 
method for assessing US jurisdiction, but will ultimately lead to a greater proliferation of global 
antitrust enforcement. See, e.g., First, supra note 16, at 712ff (asserting that an international 
system of antitrust enforcement need not be based on international agreement but rather is 
already based on implicit consensus of US antitrust extraterritoriality); Dodge, supra note 2, at 
104-06 (arguing that disregarding foreign interests in applying domestic statutes 
extraterritorially is the best way promote international cooperation and achieve optimal 
regulation). 
98. HAWK, supra note 39, at 112 (agreeing that without guidance from the Supreme Court 
lower American courts have struggled with the test); Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: 
Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1478-81 (highlighting the difficulty 
courts have had in uniformly applying the effects test). 
99. HAWK, supra note 399, at 112-13 (describing the differing interpretations of Alcoa’s 
test arising out of lower courts). See also Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 600, 613-16 (reversing a lower 
court decision that required a “direct and substantial effect on United States foreign commerce”); 
United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (requiring 
“a conspiracy . . . which affects American commerce”); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing 
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Moreover, decisions of the courts have varied on the type of effect 
required.100 
In addition to these criticisms, the application of the Sherman Act 
to foreign defendants’ conduct, often legal under the laws of their own 
sovereigns, prompted controversy among US trading partners.101 Non-
US litigants were concerned with the US government’s power to fine 
and imprison non-US defendants as well as the ability of US plaintiffs 
to subject non-US companies to expensive discovery and treble-
damage exposure.102 As a consequence, US trading partners enacted 
legislation blocking discovery and permitting defendants to “claw 
back” the treble-damages portion of any private recovery that might be 
awarded by a US court.103 
                                                                                                                       
Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949) (articulating the test as “a direct and influencing 
effect on trade”). 
100. HAWK, supra note 399, at 114-15 (commenting on lower court decisions formulating 
Alcoa’s effect requirement); Joseph E. Fortenberry, Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Antitrust 
Violations: Paths Through the Great Grimpen Mire, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 519 (1971) 
(describing the confusion in the development of the effects doctrine). 
101. See WALLER, AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 6-22 n.2 (citing reports 
documenting friendly foreign governments’ reactions to Alcoa and its progeny); JOELSON, supra 
note 52, at 64-65 (summarizing foreign reactions to US exercise of the effects doctrine); 
Popofsky, supra note 15, at 2422-23 (same); First, supra note 16, at 723-24 (same). See also 
Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627 (2001) 
(noting that disputes with trading parties over the Sherman Acts cross-border reach began just 
after Alcoa). 
102. First, supra note 16, at 723-24 (explicating non-US defendant’s concerns associated 
with the controversy over the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act). 
103. Id. at 724 (discussing the reaction of foreign sovereigns to private antitrust litigation 
in the United States subjecting non-US nationals to extensive discovery and the potential for 
treble liability); see, e.g., Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 920 (explaining that the British Protection 
of Trading Interests Act, when invoked, authorizes the English Secretary of State to prevent UK 
courts from complying with requests for document production issued by foreign tribunals and 
forbids enforcement of treble damage awards or antitrust judgments specified by the Secretary 
of State). See also supra note 15. Trading partners that enacted blocking statutes included 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and France. First, supra note 16, at 724 (listing 
countries enacting blocking statutes); Sidney Rosdeitcher, Foreign Blocking Statutes and U.S. 
Discovery: A Conflict of National Policies, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1061, 1064-66 (1984) 
(recounting foreign sovereigns’ legislative reactions to nationals being subjected to US antitrust 
litigation). 
In general, blocking statutes involved prohibiting disclosure of information located within 
the political borders of the enacting sovereign or possessed by that sovereign’s subjects. For a 
more detailed account of blocking statutes, see Alexander Layton & Angharad M. Parry, 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction – European Responses, 26 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 309, 311-13 (2004) 
(explicating the U.K.’s blocking statute, the Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980); R. 
Edward Price, Foreign Blocking Statutes and the GATT: State Sovereignty and the Enforcement 
of U.S. Economic Laws Abroad, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 315, 322-31 (1995) 
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Other calls for restraint have also emerged. In its amicus brief for 
Empagran, the DOJ maintained that US antitrust extraterritoriality as 
it pertains to private litigation, and with it the treble damage feature, 
may deter leniency applicants that greatly aid cartel prosecution.104 
Consequently, the agency argues, cartel crackdown efforts would 
suffer because the threat to cartels from leniency-applicant turncoats 
deters more cartels than would higher penalties.105 Others have 
cautioned against negative consequences of overregulation, which in 
turn may harm efficiency and consumers as much as the 
anticompetitive behavior antitrust laws proscribe.106 The growth of 
effects jurisdiction has expanded the number of different jurisdictions 
in which regulatory claims must be satisfied.107 This proliferation 
increases the cost of doing business internationally: firms must spend 
more time and money crafting and maintaining antitrust compliance 
programs, defending in lawsuits alleging illegal anticompetitive 
                                                                                                                       
(detailing the history, varieties, and consequences of blocking statutes); see generally 
Rosdeitcher, supra note 103 (explaining the purpose and function of blocking statutes). 
104. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19-21, F. 
Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724) [hereinafter DOJ 
Brief]. The EC also recognizes the dangers expanded private recovery poses to public cartel 
enforcement. See Almunia, supra note 76, at 5 (explaining that the EC Directive presents “the 
opportunity to fine-tune the interaction between the actions for damages brought by victims and 
the public enforcement by the Commission and [national competition authorities].”). 
105. DOJ Brief, supra note 104, at 20-21 (arguing that, because potential amnesty 
applicants weigh civil liability exposure when deciding whether to apply to the amnesty 
program, “civil liability to all global victims would provide a significant disincentive to seek 
amnesty from the government.”). 
106. See Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 7 n.13 & at 16 (discussing the detriment 
associated with increased regulation of a given transaction or conduct); Layton & Parry, supra 
note 103, at 313 (explaining that the U.K. saw undue extraterritorial application of the US 
antitrust law as “exposing international businesses to double jeopardy.”). See generally 
Terzaken, supra note 70 (arguing that without harmonization and restraint of extraterritoriality 
the growth of antitrust jurisdictions produces disproportionate and multiple penalties for the 
same violation where overlapping jurisdiction exists). 
107. See Wood, supra note 1, at 301-02 (noting that the triumph of the effects doctrine has 
complicated the ability of businesses to determine with certainty what conduct was lawful or 
unlawful, subjecting these businesses to increased regulation); see also infra note 216 and 
accompanying text. See also Terzaken, supra note 70:  
Companies caught in the crosshairs of serial enforcement agencies complain that 
whatever the alleged transgressions, the sanctions they and other defendants now face 
are badly out of whack. The problem isn’t just prosecutorial overkill, but outright 
piling on. One illustration is the recent Air Cargo cartel case. As part of what was 
alleged to be an overarching conspiracy to artificially inflate surcharges on global air 
freight services, antitrust prosecutors in at least ten different jurisdictions brought 
enforcement actions. 
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conduct, and completing cross-border transactions subject to merger 
reviews.108 
Lastly, worldwide governments have expressed concern that US 
antitrust extraterritoriality stunts the growth of their own antitrust 
regimes due to the allure of treble damages.109 For example, 
competition authorities have argued that improper extraterritorial 
application of US antitrust law is likely to substantially undermine the 
effectiveness of other countries’ leniency programs, which are 
successful tools in discovering unlawful cartel activity, and thus will 
interfere with those countries’ overall antitrust enforcement, including 
private enforcement.110 Additionally, broad availability of US treble 
damage recovery to non-US litigants attracts away cases that might 
otherwise be litigated in non-US courts, thereby depriving those 
jurisdictions the development of the substantial body of jurisprudence 
                                                                                                                       
108. Wood, supra note 1, at 302-03 (describing the administrative burdens associated with 
overlapping merger jurisdictions); Terzaken, supra note 70 (exemplifying the increase in 
defending in multiple lawsuits through the Air Cargo cartel case, in which defendants faced 
actions in the United States, European Union, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, 
South Africa, South Korea, and Switzerland).  In addition to these accounting costs, the growth 
of the effects doctrine may also increase the economic costs associated with chilling beneficial 
conduct.  See. e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J. L. & ECON. 445, 
447 (1985) (explaining that excessive enforcement of antitrust laws has the potential to produce 
socially undesirable costs by “inducing firms to back off, to avoid approaching the margin at 
which the costs of more competition and more cooperation are in equilibrium.”). 
109. See Diamond, supra note 12, at 810, 823-24 (touching on the argument that claims 
being pursued under the Sherman Act stunt the growth of private recovery); Margaret Bloom, 
Should Foreign Purchasers Have Access to U.S. Antitrust Damages Remedies? A Post-
Empagran Perspective from Europe, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 433, 451 (2005) (stating the 
EC’s belief that cartel deterrence by the United States alone was an insufficient deterrent and 
that if “foreign purchasers have ready access to U.S. antitrust damages remedies, this will attract 
away cases from EU courts that might otherwise by litigated in Europe.”). See also Empagran, 
542 U.S. at 167-68 (listing complaints lodged by non-US governments in amicus curiae briefs 
highlighting the trouble of treble damages in drawing non-US plaintiffs to US courts and 
interfering with their domestic enforcement policies); Layton & Parry, supra note 103, at 310-
13 (examining the U.K.’s responses to Sherman Act extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction, 
which including a recognition that “[t]here was an obvious danger that business would seek 
enforcement of antitrust laws for less than public-spirited motives” in the United States by virtue 
of treble damage availability). 
110. KFTC Motorola Brief, supra note 3, at 4 (“Such disincentive [to seek leniency with 
non-U.S. competition authorities due to potential increased exposure to U.S. antitrust liability 
under broader extraterritorial application] is likely to undermine substantially the effectiveness 
of other countries’ leniency programs and will interfere with the countries’ overall antitrust 
enforcement.”); Bloom, supra note 109, at 451 (explaining the EC’s argument that interfering 
with a competition authority’s leniency program directly harms private enforcement because 
“[u]nless cartels are uncovered by the competition authorities – most frequently through a 
leniency application – there cannot be a [private] lawsuit.”). The Korean Fair Trade Commission 
is the competition authority of South Korea. 
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that is necessary to facilitate the private enforcement of antitrust 
claims.111 An example of underdeveloped jurisprudence can be 
demonstrated in Israel, where the Israeli Supreme Court has not yet 
been required to decide whether Israel’s antitrust statute provides for 
indirect purchaser recovery.112 Other countries with underdeveloped 
private recovery doctrine, such as South Africa and Denmark, have 
seen little private litigation to fine-tune their private enforcement 
schemes, though activity is on the rise.113 
A. Non-Judicial Checks on Extraterritoriality 
In response to this international criticism, the United States has 
taken steps to clarify and define conduct that is subject to US 
jurisdiction. These efforts have taken the form of legislation (the 
FTAIA) and bilateral agreements with important trading partners 
                                                                                                                       
111. Diamond, supra note 12, at 824 (“Courts need a steady-diet of cases to feed the 
development of a body of jurisprudence that will in turn facilitate private enforcement of 
antitrust claims; if those cases are attracted to the United States, foreign antitrust development 
will suffer.”); Bloom, supra note 109, at 451 (pointing out that if recovery under US antitrust 
law is made broadly available to non-US purchasers that it strips valuable private litigation from 
jurisdictions with developing antitrust law). 
112. See Restrictive Trade Practices Law, 5748-1988 (Israel’s antitrust law); Tadmor & 
Bakal, supra note 82, at 76 (detailing private actions under Israel’s antitrust statute). 
113. See Mark Garden & Lufuno Shinwana, South Africa, in GETTING THE DEAL 
THROUGH: PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 2017 113-14 (Samantha Mobley ed., 2016) 
(explaining that there is an absence of private litigation for damages in part because private 
recovery hinges upon whether South Africa’s competition authority can prove liability but that 
an uptick has been seen marked by South Africa’s first class action antitrust suit in 2010); Henrik 
Peytz, Thomas Mygind & Mia Anne Gantzhorn, Denmark, in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: 
PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 2017 33 (Samantha Mobley ed., 2016) (“[P]rivate antitrust 
litigation is in its infancy in Denmark, but it is growing and a rise in the number of cases can be 
expected as the principles to be applied in such litigation, regarding both the procedural issues 
as well as the conditions for liability, are clear” due largely to the EC Directive); Malcom Ratz, 
Flying Into New Heights: Damages Claims Arising from Contraventions of the Competition Act, 
DE REBUS (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.derebus.org.za/flying-new-heights-damages-claims-
arising-contraventions-competition-act/ [https://perma.cc/GCF2-UP5X] (archived Oct. 26, 
2017) (announcing that a South African High Court gave the first ever judgment relating to the 
damages stage of private litigation that “will undoubtedly herald in a new phase of competition 
law in South Africa”); see also supra note 19. But see Lizl Leonardo, Comment, A Proposal to 
the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Split: Expand the Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws to 
Extraterritorial Conduct that Impacts U.S. Commerce, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 175, 208-09 (2016) 
(arguing for broader extraterritorial application in part because private recovery is only available 
in a limited number of non-US jurisdictions, and where it exists it is sparse due to low probability 
of success stemming from stringent requirements of proving actual damages and requiring 
plaintiffs to pay all court courts). For a response to these criticisms, see supra § II.B (explaining 
that a growing number of countries recognize the value of private enforcement and are enacting 
laws that provide more plaintiff-friendly discourse). 
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containing comity provisions. These agreements are examples of 
positive comity: preemptive steps taken by the United States and 
trading partners to establish enforcement protocol.114 
1. The FTAIA 
The FTAIA was drafted for the purpose of clarifying US antitrust 
statutes “to make explicit their application only to conduct having a 
‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ on domestic 
commerce or domestic exports.”115 Hoping to address the concerns 
expressed over the unrestrained effects doctrine, Congress sought to 
create a single, objective test to serve as “a simple and straightforward 
clarification of existing American law” and US antitrust regulator 
standards.116 The statute thus endorsed the effects doctrine by requiring 
that the effects of the anticompetitive conduct on US commerce “give 
rise to a claim” under US antitrust laws.117 
As the Supreme Court stressed in Empagran, the FTAIA also 
reflects principles of international comity by limiting the types of 
foreign conduct to which US antitrust law applies in order to avoid 
unreasonable interference with the commercial activity of other 
countries.118 The statute constitutes the first time since 1890 that the 
jurisdictional language of the Sherman Act distinguishes between 
imports and exports, removing export and purely foreign transactions 
from US courts while carving-out import transactions.119 Notably, 
though, while the FTAIA was meant to limit antitrust liability for US 
sellers transacting abroad with foreign buyers, one consideration in the 
                                                                                                                       
114. See infra § III.A.2. 
115. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (1982). 
116. Id. 
117. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2); H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5 (1982) (“Since Judge Learned Hand’s 
opinion in [Alcoa], it has been relatively clear that it is the situs of the effects as opposed to the 
conduct, that determines whether United States antitrust law applies.”). 
118. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164-65 (explaining that the FTAIA was intended to prevent 
“unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations” because untamed 
extraterritorial application of US law “creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign 
nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs.”); Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d 
at 854 (“As the Supreme Court stressed in Empagran, the public recognition of [the FTAIA’s 
international limitation of U.S. antitrust law] was inspired largely by international comity.”). 
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (exempting export transactions from the Sherman Act where the 
effect of the illegal anticompetitive activity occurs abroad); see also HAWK, supra note 39, at 
173 (adding that though the FTAIA differentiates jurisdiction over import and export 
transactions it is largely consistent with prior US case law). 
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statute’s formulation was to maintain the protection of US laws for 
foreign purchasers transacting within the United States.120 
2. Positive Comity 
In addition to legislation, the United States and other countries 
have also entered into bilateral agreements with positive comity 
provisions, whereby the United States’ competition authorities, the 
DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission, and those of other countries 
typically agree to, among other things, certain measures recognized as 
necessary to avoid potential enforcement conflicts.121 Comity is a 
concept of reciprocal deference, described as serving “our international 
system like the mortar which cements together a brick house.”122 By 
                                                                                                                       
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(B) (applying US antitrust law to export opportunities of a 
person engaging in exporting from the United States); 1981 FTAIA Hearings, supra note 57, at 
114 (“Obviously, we will always have situations where foreign firms are in the United States 
doing business in the United States, for example, purchasing in the United States, and will have 
the protection of our laws, whereas to the extent they do business within their own domicile they 
would not have the protection of those laws.”); Kruman, 284 F.3d at 403 n.10 (“Indeed, to deny 
[foreign purchasers] this protection [of U.S. antitrust law in American markets] could violate 
this Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties this country has entered into with a number 
of foreign nations.”); supra notes 56 & 57 and accompanying text. But see WALLER, AMERICAN 
BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 9-11 (concluding that the majority of cases where plaintiffs seek to 
assert jurisdiction under the FTAIA held that the statute bars US jurisdiction even for domestic 
conduct where the only effects are felt in other markets); cf. id. at 9-14 (noting that “the FTAIA 
is unlikely to protect defendants accused of restraining competition in export markets as part of 
a broader conspiracy in the United States or world markets.”). 
121. See, e.g., Agreement on Antitrust Cooperation Between the United States Department 
of Justice and the United States Federal Trade Commission, of the One Part, and the National 
Institute for the Defense of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property (INDECOPI) 
of the Republic of Peru, of the Other Part, May 26, 2016, U.S.-Peru, 
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/cooperation-agreements/us-peru-antitrust-cooperation-agreement 
[https://perma.cc/4EX7-YNY9] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) [hereinafter U.S.-Peru Bilateral 
Agreement] (the United States’ latest bilateral antitrust agreement which provides that “[t]he 
U.S. antitrust agencies and INDECOPI shall, within the framework of their laws, and to the 
extent compatible with their important interests, give careful consideration to the important 
interests of the other country’s competition authority throughout all phases of their enforcement 
activities”); Cooper, supra note 6, at 388ff (recounting the events that led up to and formed the 
basis for the U.S-Japan bilateral antitrust cooperation agreement). 
122. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937. See also Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 6 
(“Comity is a horizontal, nation-to-nation concept, seeking – by reciprocal deference – to 
maximize the joint interests of the affected nations or to split their differences through repeated 
interactions.”); Snell, supra note 16, at 229 n.83 (“The traditional concept of international 
comity is a negative one: A nation refrains from extending its own legal or administrative 
activities into the areas of competence of another nation state.”). The Supreme Court of Canada 
has adopted a similar legal definition of international comity. See Morguard Invs., Ltd. v. Be 
Savoye, 1990 S.C.R. 1077, 1096 (Can.) (“[Comity] is a recognition which one nation allows 
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due 
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definition, international comity is a doctrine that counsels voluntary 
forbearance when a sovereign that has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction 
concludes that a second sovereign has a greater claim to jurisdiction 
under principles of international law.123 However, international comity 
never obligates a national forum to ignore the rights of its own citizens 
or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.124 
Positive comity, on the other hand, entails “one nation helping the 
other, with respect to international rules of peaceful cooperation and 
assistance.”125 Use of positive comity in US bilateral trade agreements 
has typically addressed cooperation between competition authorities 
and attempts to avoid jurisdictional and sovereignty tensions “by 
placing initial responsibility for investigation of market access barriers 
into the hands of the jurisdiction where the alleged anticompetitive 
behavior occurs.”126 In other words, it acts as a “mechanism whereby 
the jurisdiction more closely associated with the alleged 
anticompetitive conduct assumes primary responsibility for the 
investigation and possible remedy,” precluding the need for 
extraterritorial enforcement.127 These bilateral agreements reflect the 
United States’ objective of increasing coordination to avoid 
enforcement system clashes and international disputes, which have 
                                                                                                                       
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the right of its own citizens or of other 
persons who are under the protection of its laws.”). 
123. Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 8 (defining international comity). See also Eleanor Fox, 
Extraterritoriality, Antitrust, and the New Restatement: Is “Reasonableness” the Answer?, 19 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 565, 567 n.4 (1987) (explaining that some see the concept of comity 
as fully discretionary while others see it as an element of obligation); supra note 21 and 
accompanying text. 
124. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164 (comity contemplates due regard to the national forum’s own 
citizens and other persons under protection of its laws); Morguard Invs., 1990 S.C.R. at 1096 
(same). 
125. Snell, supra note 16, at 229 n.83 (defining positive comity in comparison to the 
traditional sense of international comity); see, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities Regarding the 
Application of Their Competition Laws, U.S.-EC, art. I., Sept. 23, 1991, 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/0525.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F5ZQ-MUTR] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (“The purpose of this Agreement is to promote 
cooperation and coordination and lessen the possibility or impact of differences between the 
Parties in the application of their competition laws.”). 
126. ICPAC Report, supra note 6, at 226-27. See, e.g., U.S.-Peru Bilateral Agreement, 
supra note 121, at Art. 1(1) (“The purpose of this Agreement is to promote cooperation, 
including cooperation in the enforcement of competition laws, and to ensure that the U.S. 
antitrust agencies and INDECOPI give careful consideration to each other’s important interests 
in the application of their competition laws.”). 
127. ICPAC Report, supra note 6, at 226. 
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tended to hurt US business interests.128 The United States currently has 
cooperative agreements, memorandum of understandings, or enhanced 
comity agreements with fifteen jurisdictions, including the EC.129 But, 
these bilateral agreements do not override inconsistent provisions of 
US law because they are not treaties ratified by the United States 
Senate.130 To date, however, positive comity provisions do not address 
jurisdictional concerns for private litigation. 
B. Judicial Response to Sherman Act Extraterritoriality 
In addition to legislation and positive comity, US courts have also 
considered international comity in determining whether or not the 
United States has jurisdiction over certain conduct repugnant to US 
antitrust law. Three cases in particular have articulated international 
comity principles: Timberlane, Hartford Fire, and Empagran. 
However, it would not be until the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Empagran that international comity would function as a limitation on 
extraterritorial jurisdiction for antitrust lawsuits in all US courts.131 
1. Timberlane 
Timberlane is the first decision to have recognized the comity 
doctrine as a potential defense or limiting factor in cases brought under 
the Sherman Act.132 International comity as a doctrine of limitation was 
                                                                                                                       
128. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 6, at 388ff (discussing the events and circumstances 
leading the 1999 agreement between Japan and the United States). 
129. See International Competition and Consumer Protection Agreements, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/international/international-cooperation-agreements 
[https://perma.cc/7L3U-9XNA] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017). Jurisdictions include Australia 
(1982), Brazil (1999), Canada (1995, enhanced comity in 2004), Chile (2011), China (2011), 
Colombia (2014), EC (1991, enhanced comity in 1998), Germany (1976), India (2012), Israel 
(1999), Japan (1999), Mexico (2000), Russia (2009), South Korea (2015), and Peru (2016). 
130. ICPAC Report, supra note 6, at Annex 1-Cv. 
131. See, e.g., Waller, Twilight, supra note 64, at 564 (2000) (“Since [1976], comity has 
remained the darling of the majority of academic commentators, but has received an ambivalent 
reception in the courts and uniform rejection from American legislators.”). Recent lower court 
approaches to comity analysis have largely followed the precedents set in Hartford Fire and 
Empagran. See, e.g., In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 185-86 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(relying on Hartford Fire in conducting a comity analysis of whether US and Chinese laws 
presented a “true conflict”); Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 834 (relying in part on Empagran’s 
invocation of international comity to bar recovery by a US parent company for antitrust injuries 
dealt to its foreign non-wholly owned subsidiaries). 
132. See BREYER, supra note 7, at 99 (explaining that with Timberlane the Ninth Circuit 
for the first time undertook an interest-balancing analysis to determine the proprietary of 
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first proposed as the “jurisdictional rule of reason” by Kingman 
Brewster in 1958 and reached its zenith in 1976 when the Ninth Circuit 
in Timberlane declared that a comity analysis was required before 
exercising jurisdiction to prescribe under the Sherman Act.133 In that 
case, a US plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a US bank, conspired 
with officials in Honduras to prevent Timberlane’s subsidiaries in 
Honduras from milling lumber and exporting it to the United States.134 
Importantly, the alleged anticompetitive activity took place entirely 
outside of the United States, was perpetrated mainly by foreign 
citizens, and the effect was primarily felt in Honduras.135 
The court held that an effect on US commerce was necessary but 
not sufficient to assert US jurisdiction.136 Rather, courts should assess 
whether the “interests of, and links to, the United States – including the 
magnitude of the effect on American foreign commerce – are 
sufficiently strong, vis-à-vis those of other nations, to justify an 
assertion of extraterritorial authority.”137 To do so, the court put forth a 
balancing test to account for (1) potential conflicts of law or policy, (2) 
identity of the parties, (3) expectation of antitrust enforcement, (4) 
comparative effect of the alleged conduct between the United States 
                                                                                                                       
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act); Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 7 
(“Timberlane [is] the parent of U.S. antitrust comity ‘doctrine.’”). 
133. Popofsky, supra note 15, at 2423-24; Waller, Twilight, supra note 64, at 564. See 
also KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958). 
The Second, Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits would later follow Timberlane’s lead. See In re 
Vitamin C Litig., 837 F.3d at 184-86 (employing the Timberlane factors to determine whether 
or not to abstain from asserting jurisdiction on comity grounds); Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Matsui 
& Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that defendants failed to satisfy the Timberlane test 
in support of summary judgment motion); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864 
(10th Cir. 1981) (employing Timberlane analysis to find that United States courts had no 
jurisdiction over a suit in which a foreign plaintiff alleged Sherman Act violations committed 
by US companies’ foreign subsidiaries); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 
1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that where foreign nations were involved, foreign policy, 
reciprocity, comity, and limitations of judicial power were considerations have bearing on the 
court’s decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction). Not all circuits followed, however. See 
Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 948-49 (observing that the Timberlane factors “are not useful in 
resolving the controversy” involving defendants initiating suit in British court to bar US court 
from adjudicating antitrust claims brought by a British plaintiff); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 
617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding that failing to consider Timberlane test did not 
amount to an abuse of discretion). 
134. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 601. 
135. Id. (summarizing the plaintiffs’ allegations); Diamond, supra note 12, at 813 
(distinguishing Timberlane from American Banana and Alcoa). 
136. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 611-12, 613 (proclaiming the effects doctrine incomplete 
because it does not account for foreign sovereigns’ interests). 
137. Id. at 613. 
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and the foreign country, (5) degree of harm to US commerce, (6) the 
foreseeability of the effect, and (7) the importance of the violations 
alleged in the United States compared with those in the foreign 
country.138 
2. Hartford Fire 
In contrast to the attention the Ninth Circuit paid evaluating a 
foreign sovereign’s interests in regulating alleged anticompetitive 
conduct in Timberlane, the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire articulated 
a new principle of prescriptive jurisdiction by which international 
comity considerations are relevant only when a “true conflict between 
domestic and foreign law” exists.139 The Hartford Fire Court defined a 
“true conflict” of law as when a party subject to regulation by two states 
cannot simultaneously comply with the laws of both, lest the laws of 
one be infringed.140 Notably, the Court gave little contemplation to the 
FTAIA, explaining only that in enacting the statute “Congress 
expressed no view on the question whether a court with Sherman Act 
jurisdiction should ever decline to exercise such jurisdiction on 
grounds of international comity” but declining to answer that 
question.141 
3. Empagran 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire set the stage for a change 
of course on which the Court embarked in Empagran.142 In that 
                                                                                                                       
138. See id. at 614. The court concluded after listing the balancing test’s elements that “[a] 
court evaluating these factors should identify the potential degree of conflict if American 
authority is asserted.” Id. 
139. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-99; David J. Gerber, Prescriptive Authority: 
Global Markets as a Challenge to National Regulatory Systems, 26 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 287, 
296 (2004). Cf. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 854 (explaining that Hartford Fire suggested a 
pragmatic reason for the FTAIA’s inapplicability to import transactions, namely that 
“[f]oreigners who want to earn money from the sale of goods or services in American markets 
should expect to have to comply with U.S. law”). 
140. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799. 
141. Id. at 798. Recently, though, lower courts have employed such comity analyses. In In 
re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a price-fixing claim 
brought against Chinese manufacturers of Vitamin C chiefly due to the existence of a “true 
conflict” between Chinese and United States law. See 837 F.3d at 185-86 (finding that while the 
existence of a “true conflict” may not be a necessary prerequisite for invoking the doctrine of 
comity, the existence of one is sufficient to abstain from asserting jurisdiction). 
142. See Fox, Remedies, supra note 14, at 578 (noting that in Empagran the Supreme 
Court substantially adopted Justice Scalia’s Hartford Fire dissent); Diamond, supra note 12, at 
815 (citing Harry First, Prof., NYU School of Law, Remarks at the N.Y. State Bar Ass’n 2005 
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dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia reframes the question before the 
Court as not whether the United States has the prescriptive jurisdiction 
to subject the British defendants to US antitrust law, but rather whether 
it has exercised that jurisdiction in enacting the Sherman Act.143 In 
doing so, Justice Scalia invokes a canon of statutory construction 
predicated on prescriptive comity to argue that Congress did not intend 
for the Sherman Act to unequivocally apply to extraterritorial conduct 
without considering the jurisdictional claims of foreign states.144 This 
reflected the Court’s new approach to comity, one which was 
concerned not with the direct conflicts highlighted in Hartford Fire but 
instead focused on harmonization of similar national laws that seek to 
achieve common objectives.145 
In Empagran, which was a follow-on action to the Vitamins 
Case146 cartel prosecution of the late 1990s, foreign and US class 
plaintiffs asserted a Sherman Act claim against a mix of foreign and 
US defendants.147 After the US class settled, the Empagran Court faced 
an issue of interpreting the FTAIA to decide whether the statute’s 
condition that a requisite domestic effect “give[] rise to a claim” refers 
broadly to any potential claim or specifically to the plaintiff’s claim.148 
                                                                                                                       
Antitrust Law Section Symposium: Empagran and the International Reach of U.S. Antitrust 
Laws (Jan. 27, 2005)). 
143. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
144. See id. at 814-21; JOELSON, supra note 52, at 53 (“The Court reasoned that Congress, 
mindful of principles of customary international law implicating the legitimate sovereign 
interests of other nations, sought to release from U.S. antitrust constructs anticompetitive 
conduct causing foreign effects unrelated to domestic effects.”). 
145. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164-65 (observing that the contemporary global economy 
demands harmonization of potentially conflicting laws of different nations); BREYER, supra note 
7, at 92 (“‘Comity’ once referred simply to the need to ensure that domestic and foreign laws 
did not impose contradictory duties upon the same individual . . . Today it means something 
more. In applying it, our Court has increasingly sought interpretations of domestic law that 
would allow it to work in harmony with foreign laws, so that together they can more effectively 
achieve common objectives.”). 
146. The Vitamins Case was a prosecution of an international price-fixing conspiracy 
among vitamin manufacturers that began in the late 1990s and involved defendants from the 
United States, Switzerland, and Germany. Diamond, supra note 12, at 806 (describing briefly 
the cartel prosecution leading to Empagran); First, supra note 16, at 712ff (narrating in detail 
the events of the Vitamins Case cartel prosecution). The vitamins at issue were “most commonly 
used as nutritional supplements or to enrich animal feed; they [were] also used in vitamin 
premixes to enrich numerous processed foods (such as breakfast cereals).” First, supra note 16, 
at 715. 
147. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159-61 (detailing the procedural posture of the case); 
Diamond, supra note 12, at 806 (summarizing the procedural history leading up to the Empagran 
decision). 
148. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159. 
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Following similar logic to Justice Scalia’s Hartford Fire dissent, the 
Supreme Court invoked prescriptive comity to conclude that Congress 
did not intend to expand the Sherman Act’s scope in anyway by 
enacting the FTAIA, and thus foreign injury resulting from foreign 
conduct independent of a domestic effect did not qualify for the 
statute’s carve-out.149 In effect, Empagran dictated that the FTAIA has 
two distinct causation inquiries, one asking whether a defendant’s 
foreign conduct causes a cognizable domestic effect, and the other 
asking whether that effect causes the plaintiff’s injury.150 This is the 
current governing US case law on the FTAIA. 
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Although clarity was one of Congress’ goals in enacting the 
FTAIA, the statute as drafted is anything but clear, and the FTAIA 
itself has contributed to the ill-defined boundaries of the effects 
doctrine. The FTAIA has produced a number of circuit splits, one of 
which was decided by Empagran.151 Other circuit splits currently exist, 
including one between the Seventh and Ninth circuits concerning the 
interpretation of the FTAIA’s requirement that anticompetitive 
behavior have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” 
on US commerce which the Supreme Court has so far abstained from 
resolving.152 As explained in Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., the 
“substantial” and “reasonably foreseeable” prongs have produced little 
dispute and are relatively straightforward.153 Rather, what it takes to 
show “direct” is less clear.154 The Seventh Circuit took the position 
that, like in tort law, recovery should be cut off for injuries that are too 
remote from the cause of an injury and held that the term “direct” 
means only “a reasonably proximate causal nexus.”155 
To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. LSL 
Biotechnologies looked to the Supreme Court’s definition of “direct” 
                                                                                                                       
149. See id. at 163-69. 
150. See Lotes, 753 F.3d at 414. 
151. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 160-61; see also Amelie Doublet, Motorola Mobility II and 
the Circuit Split Over the Interpretation of the FTAIA: The Necessity of Supreme Court Review, 
83 USLW Issue No. 43 2015-05, Bloomberg BNA.  
152. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015); Doublet, 
supra note 151. 
153. 683 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2012). 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 856-57. 
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from a different statute germane to international relations.156 Drawing 
from dictionary definitions and language in the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act that is similar to that in the FTAIA, the court held that 
an effect is “direct” if “it follows the immediate consequence of the 
defendant’s activity.”157 This definition was subsequently utilized by 
the Ninth Circuit in its decision in United States v. Hsiung (the criminal 
prosecution of the defendants in Motorola Mobility), which expressly 
rejected Minn-Chem’s “reasonably proximate causal nexus” approach 
and reiterated instead the broader “immediate consequence” test.158 
A. Problems Arising from the Circuit Split 
Using Minn-Chem’s definition of “direct,” however, has produced 
a questionable holding in Motorola Mobility.159 In that case, a US 
company, Motorola, brought a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, alleging that it was the victim of price-fixing among foreign 
manufacturers of liquid crystal display (“LCD”) panels used as 
components in the manufacture of cellphones.160 The LCD panel 
manufacturers had already been found guilty of participating in an 
illegal cartel, and those convictions were affirmed in Hsiung.161 
Motorola was a major purchaser of LCD panels, but had purchased 
most of the price-fixed products through its majority-owned foreign 
subsidiaries.162 Only one percent of its purchases were made directly 
by Motorola in the United States and incorporated into cellphones also 
sold in the United States.163 The other ninety-nine percent of its 
purchases were made abroad.164 Of those purchases, forty-two percent 
                                                                                                                       
156. 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 
504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992) (interpreting the “direct effect” in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605, to be an effect that “follows ‘as an immediate consequence of the 
defendant’s . . . activity.’”). 
157. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d at 680 (drawing similarities between the exception in the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the FTAIA). 
158. 778 F.3d 738, 758 (9th Cir. 2015). See also id. at 759 n.9 (recognizing the 
disagreement with the Seventh Circuit). 
159. See generally Ellen Meriwether, Motorola Mobility and the FTAIA: If Not Here, Then 
Where?, 29 ANTITRUST 8 (2015) (critiquing the outcome of Motorola Mobility). See also 
Leonardo, supra note 113, at 206ff (same). 
160. Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 817. 
161. Id.; see also Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2015). 
162. Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 817, 818. 
163. Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 817. 
164. Id. 
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were incorporated into phones destined for the United States, while the 
remainder were used to make phones sold abroad.165 
In its first stab at the appeal of the lower court’s decision, the 
Seventh Circuit following Minn-Chem’s definition of “direct” held that 
anticompetitive behavior affecting intermediary products, rather than 
final products, could not have a “direct” effect on US commerce.166 
After additional consideration likely influenced by the DOJ’s concern 
with the initial holding and its implications for international cartel 
enforcement, the court vacated the first opinion and opted for a 
different approach to the same conclusion.167 Summarizing that the 
case involved “components [that] were sold by their manufacturers to 
their foreign subsidiaries, which incorporated them into the finished 
product to Motorola for resale in the United States,” Judge Posner 
branded the wrongful conduct, effect, and injury as entirely 
extraterritorial because Motorola and its subsidiaries did not function 
as one enterprise.168 Therefore, the court construed Motorola as an 
indirect purchaser, barred from bringing a claim under the Sherman Act 
by virtue of the holding in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,169 and 
concluded that the entire transaction falls outside of the FTAIA’s 
exception, though recognizing that the effect on US commerce may, 
perhaps, be “direct.”170 
But, the court’s reliance on Illinois Brick was no better than its 
initial attempt to characterize the effect of the LCD cartel on US 
commerce. Several points suggest Motorola Mobility was wrongly 
decided, including inconsistencies with US precedent and statutes. In 
holding that Motorola and its subsidiaries did not function as one 
enterprise because they are governed by the different laws of the 
countries in which they are incorporated and operated, Judge Posner 
                                                                                                                       
165. Id. 
166. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 746 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2014). 
167. See Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 817. The DOJ’s amicus brief urged the court to 
vacate its March 27, 2014 opinion, arguing that the court’s holding - that component price-fixing 
does not directly affect US commerce in component-incorporating products - severely hampered 
the agency’s ability to prosecute international cartels. See Brief for the United States and the 
Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 1, 17-18, Motorola 
Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-8003). 
168. See id. at 819 (“The conduct increased the cost to Motorola of the cellphones that it 
bought from its foreign subsidiaries, but the cartel-engendered price increase in the components 
and in the price of the cellphones that incorporated them occurred entirely in foreign 
commerce.”). 
169. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
170. See Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 819-823. 
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disregarded the Supreme Court’s central holding in Copperweld Corp. 
v. Independence Tube Corp.171 Copperweld’s progeny have found a 
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiaries to be a “single entity” 
with “complete unity of interest” and, similarly, have also found a lack 
of relevant differences between a corporation and its wholly owned 
subsidiary for Sherman Act analysis.172 Additionally, for non-wholly 
owned subsidiaries, courts relying on Copperweld have treated a parent 
and its non-wholly owned subsidiary as a single entity for antitrust 
purposes where the parent held a controlling majority of the 
subsidiary’s stock.173 
In addition to precedent, other US antitrust statutes treat parents 
and subsidiaries as one entity. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvement Act (“HSR”) requires a business acquiring another 
business in a transaction meeting certain thresholds to file a premerger 
notification with the government.174 If the acquiring business is 
controlled by a parent corporation, the HSR mandates that the “ultimate 
parent entity” file the notification regardless of the nationality of the 
acquired business.175 Furthermore, appearing to be influenced by 
                                                                                                                       
171. 467 U.S. 752 (1984). In Copperweld, the Court held that because subsidiaries and 
their parent corporations are not independent entities, they are incapable of conspiring with one 
another within the meaning of the Sherman Act. Id. at 777. The Court reasoned that “in reality 
a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary always have a ‘unity of purpose or common design’ . . 
. whether or not the parent keeps a tight rein over the subsidiary.” Id. at 771. 
172. See Century Oil Tool, Inc. v. Production Specialties, Inc., 737 F.2d 1316, 1317 (5th 
Cir. 1984) (observing the lack of any relevant differences between a corporation and its wholly 
owned subsidiary, and two corporations wholly owned by a third corporation); Newport 
Components v. NEC Home Elec., Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1544 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that 
manufacturer and two wholly owned subsidiaries must be viewed as a “single entity” with 
“complete unity of interest” for purposes of the Sherman Act). 
173. See Direct Media Corp. v. Camden Tel. & Tel. Co., 989 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 (S.D. 
Ga. 1997) (parent owned fifty-one percent); Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs. v. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp., 
849 F. Supp. 702, 706 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (eighty percent); Novatel Comm’cns, Inc. v. Cellular 
Tel. Supply, Inc., No. C85-2674A, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16017, at *25-26 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 
1986) (fifty-one percent). See also Wesley Health Sys., LLC v. Forrest County Bd. of 
Supervisors, No. 2:12-CV-59-KS-MTP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7764, at *23-29 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 
22, 2014) (two-thirds control of the board); Coast Cities Truck Sales v. Navistar Int’l Transp. 
Co., 912 F. Supp. 747, 765 (D.N.J. 1995) (seventy percent of the voting shares). But see In re 
Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litig., No. 2:09-md-02042, 216 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146013, 
at *25-28 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2016) (relying on Motorola Mobility to hold that a US parent 
corporation may not treat its minority-owned foreign manufacturing subsidiary as an extension 
of itself for satisfying the FTAIA or avoiding the indirect purchaser-standing rule). 
174. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (setting out the criteria triggering premerger filing under HSR). 
175. 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(a)(1) (clarifying that the entity responsible for HSR filing, 
“person,” means the “ultimate parent company”). 
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Copperweld, the HSR does not require filing for the merger of two 
wholly owned subsidiaries with a common parent.176 
Motorola also argued that it was the “target” of the illegal conduct 
or, alternatively, the direct victim because its subsidiary “passed on” 
the cartel-inflated portion of the original purchase price to Motorola.177 
In Illinois Brick, which also contemplated the offensive use of the ill-
fated pass-on theory in US antitrust jurisprudence, Justice White 
surmised that a situation in which the pass-on defense “might be 
permitted” is where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its 
customer.178 Posner, highlighting the semantic difference between 
“might be” and “is,” brushed this off as meaningless.179 
                                                                                                                       
176. 16 C.F.R. § 802.30 (exempting intracorporate transactions from HSR filing 
requirements); Michael D. Belsley, Comment, The Vatican Merger Defense – Should Two 
Catholic Hospitals Seeking to Merge be Considered a Single Entity for Purposes of Antitrust 
Merger Analysis?, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 720, 727 n.40 (1996) (describing Copperweld’s influence 
on the government’s HSR filing instructions). 
Even assuming it is appropriate to view Motorola as a separate and downstream entity from 
its subsidiaries for the purposes of its analysis, the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on Illinois Brick is 
still misplaced. The Illinois Brick Court reasoned that allowing both direct and indirect 
purchasers to bring suit would place a greater evidentiary burden on plaintiffs by necessitating 
complex econometric modeling to assess what portion of the inflated price was passed on to the 
indirect purchaser and what portion absorbed by the direct purchaser. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 
731-32 (discussing Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968)). So, it 
concluded, “antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating the full recovery 
… in the direct purchaser.” Id. at 735. But because Motorola controls its foreign subsidiaries, 
there would not be both a direct purchaser suit and an indirect purchaser suit. See Appellant’s 
Opening Brief at 9, Motorola Mobility, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 14-8003 (7th Cir. Aug. 
29, 2014) (stating that Motorola “functioned with its subsidiaries as a single enterprise”); 
Meriwether, supra note 159, at 13 (enumerating the ways in which Motorola controlled all 
aspects of its mobile phone business). Indeed, Posner all but concedes this point and instead 
distinguishes Motorola from its foreign subsidiaries by pointing out that the foreign subsidiaries 
are “incorporated under and regulated by foreign law.” Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 823. The 
issue faced in Illinois Brick was therefore categorically different from the issue fabricated by the 
Seventh Circuit – injury was, in fact, quite easily assessed for the “indirect purchaser” in 
Motorola Mobility in comparison with the Illinois Brick scenario and other classic indirect 
purchaser cases. 
177. See id. at 822-23 (discussing Motorola’s “target” and “pass-on” theories of standing). 
The pass-on theory was an argument originally made by defendant cartelists that the plaintiff 
direct purchaser did not suffer antitrust injury because any overpayment made as a result of the 
alleged anticompetitive conduct was passed on to the plaintiff’s customers in the form of inflated 
downstream prices. See Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 488-93. The issue decided in Illinois Brick 
involved offensive use of pass-on as justification for indirect purchaser antitrust standing. Ill. 
Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 726. 
178. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 736 n.16. 
179. Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 823. 
Even assuming it is appropriate to view Motorola as a separate entity from its subsidiaries 
for the purposes of its analysis, the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on Illinois Brick is still misplaced. 
The Illinois Brick Court reasoned that allowing both direct and indirect purchasers to bring suit 
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The Motorola Mobility decision has negative consequences for 
US antitrust law, non-US subsidiaries of American parents relying on 
US law for potential recovery, US businesses operating internationally 
with international subsidiaries, and consumers. In essence, the Seventh 
Circuit announced a broad rule that eliminates private antitrust 
remedies where the first purchase of a price-fixed component occurs 
offshore, drastically mitigating the ability of US antitrust law to deter 
harmful foreign conduct targeting US markets.180 Is Posner really 
suggesting that American businesses are only protected by US antitrust 
law when the domestic parent itself engages in such wholly foreign 
transactions?181 
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit’s decision creates a glaring 
inconsonance with the Ninth Circuit’s in what should be similar 
outcomes to similar cases. Despite justifying its second decision the 
Seventh Circuit by warning that “rampant extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law ‘creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign nation’s 
ability to independently regulate its own affairs,’” the court did not 
delve into any meaningful comity analysis.182 Particularly troubling is 
that while concerned with the prospect of “rampant extraterritoriality,” 
the court gives no attention to whether Motorola would be able to 
recover abroad or, more importantly, whether the cartels’ host 
                                                                                                                       
would place a greater evidentiary burden on plaintiffs by necessitating complex econometric 
modeling to assess what portion of the inflated price was passed on to the indirect purchaser and 
what portion absorbed by the direct purchaser. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 731-32 (discussing 
Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968)). So, it concluded, “antitrust 
laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating the full recovery … in the direct 
purchaser.” Id. at 735. But because Motorola controls its foreign subsidiaries, there would not 
be both a direct purchaser suit and an indirect purchaser suit. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 
9, Motorola Mobility, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 14-8003 (7th Cir. Aug. 29, 2014) (stating 
that Motorola “functioned with its subsidiaries as a single enterprise”); Meriwether, supra note 
159, at 13 (enumerating the ways in which Motorola controlled all aspects of its mobile phone 
business). Indeed, Posner all but concedes this point and instead distinguishes Motorola from its 
foreign subsidiaries by pointing out that the foreign subsidiaries are “incorporated under and 
regulated by foreign law.” Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 823. The issue faced in Illinois Brick 
was therefore categorically different from the issue fabricated by the Seventh Circuit – injury 
was, in fact, quite easily assessed for the “indirect purchaser” in Motorola Mobility in 
comparison with the Illinois Brick scenario and other classic indirect purchaser cases. 
180. See Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 823. 
181. See, e.g., Meriwether, supra note 159, at 13 (“In short, a foreign plaintiff is a foreign 
plaintiff, and it matters little (maybe not at all) how connected that plaintiff is with the United 
States, or how its business affects domestic commerce.”). See also Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d 
at 823 (stating in dicta that even if Motorola and its subsidiaries could be considered as a single 
entity that it would not have changed the court’s outcome because it “would have been injured 
abroad when ‘it’ purchased the price-fixed components). 
182. Id. at 824 (quoting Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165). 
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countries have any incentive to prosecute “when their nationals engage 
in hardcore cartel conduct directed at a huge U.S. consumer market” 
that caused harm in that, opposed to its own, market.183 
B. Comity Analysis: A Possible Solution to Interpreting the FTAIA? 
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit may have initially reached a more 
reasonable conclusion in its first decision of Motorola Mobility had the 
court taken a different interpretational approach, such as one taken by 
the Supreme Court. Because the FTAIA’s effect test reflects an 
evaluation of a US jurisdictional claim, a possible method of aiding the 
courts’ construction of what a “direct” effect entails may be to follow 
Empagran’s example and in fact employ a comity analysis.184 The two 
most recent comity principle constructions, as discussed, are in 
Hartford Fire and Empagran. However, the different comity 
approaches the Supreme Court undertakes in both cases result in 
standards that are under-inclusive and over-inclusive, respectively. 
The Supreme Court’s approach in Hartford Fire suggested the 
unhelpfulness, if not irrelevance, of comity if there was no true conflict 
                                                                                                                       
183. Id.; Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 860 (observing that governments have no incentive to 
prosecute domestic export cartels because they “would logically be pleased to reap economic 
rents from other countries”); Meriwether, supra note 159, at 13 (critiquing the Seventh Circuit’s 
approach in relying on comity considerations, particularly in light of Hsiung where no “serious 
concerns of excessive or unwarranted antitrust enforcement” were raised). 
184. See Saskatchewan Minn-Chem Brief, supra note 3, at 19-22 (arguing that principles 
of international comity should be used in interpreting the FTAIA’s “direct” criterion); BREYER, 
supra note 7, at 100 (discussing the FTAIA’s effects test exceptions that would give rise to 
Sherman Act claim); Max Huffman, A Retrospective on Twenty-Five Years of the Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 285, 315-16 (2007) (describing the FTAIA’s 
“direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” condition as a codification of the Alcoa effects 
test in the form of an objective version of the test’s intent requirement); supra note 35 and 
accompanying text. As suggested in Empagran, comity analyses may look different in 
governmental actions in comparison with private damages cases. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 
170-71. This Note addresses the latter, particularly because comity at the government level may 
be, and in many cases is, addressed by positive comity provisions in bilateral agreements. See 
supra § III.A.2. 
It is worth noting, however, that the FTAIA is silent is to whether a comity balancing test 
is proper in the statute’s construction. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 10 (1982) (“[T]he bill is 
intended neither to prevent nor to encourage additional judicial recognition of the special 
international characteristics of transactions. If a court determines that the requirements for the 
subject matter jurisdiction are met, this bill would have no effect on the courts’ ability to employ 
notions of comity . . . or otherwise to take account of the international character of the 
transaction.”); Griffin, supra note 15, at 162 (“Congress took a neutral stance towards the Ninth 
Circuit’s ‘jurisdictional rule of reason’ analysis, indicating that the Act simply stated the 
requirements for jurisdiction and was not intended to prevent or encourage balancing tests that 
might limit exercise of that jurisdiction.”). 
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of laws.185 Hartford Fire’s comity test is under-inclusive in the sense 
that comity considerations would rarely be triggered, perhaps only in 
cases where a foreign state established laws mandating anticompetitive 
behavior.186 Indeed, the First Circuit in Nippon Paper suggested that 
Hartford Fire had “stunted” the growth of comity in antitrust, and 
Professor Eleanor Fox proclaimed that “[the decision in Hartford Fire] 
gives U.S. jurists and enforcers license to disregard the interests of non-
Americans.”187 
Empagran’s comity analysis, on the other hand, may be rigidly 
over-inclusive to the point where important US antitrust law objectives, 
such as deterrence and remedy, may go unserved. Turning its back on 
the Supreme Court’s previous holdings in Continental Ore and Pfizer, 
the decision’s use of comity may in fact have created “a handicap going 
forward [that] would lead to under-deterrence as well as unfairness.”188 
As Judge Higginbotham’s dissent in Den Norske v. HeereMac stresses, 
the FTAIA does not alter Pfizer’s affirmation of foreign plaintiffs’ 
ability to sue under the Sherman Act, which was expressly approved in 
the statute’s legislative history.189 
V. SOLVING THE COURTS’ INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATION 
OF THE FTAIA AND APPLICATION OF COMITY PRINCIPLES: A 
COMITY BALANCING TEST 
Interpreting the FTAIA has proven to be challenging and 
problematic. Apart from the deficiencies associated with the treatment 
of Motorola and its subsidiaries, Motorola Mobility may have been 
better decided by using a comity balancing test similar to the one in 
Timberlane, which during its time was regarded as a middle-of-the-
                                                                                                                       
185. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-99; Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 7 n.11 
(commenting on Hartford Fire’s approach to comity). 
186. See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 139, at 296 (“[T]he Court appeared to dispense with 
balancing considerations, at least for most cases”). 
187. Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 8; Eleanor Fox, National Law, Global Markets, and 
Hartford Fire: Eyes Wide Shut, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 77 (2000). See also Waller, Twilight, 
supra note 64, at 569 (discussing the effect of Hartford Fire on the use of comity analysis in US 
antitrust jurisprudence). 
188. Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 9. 
189. 241 F.3d 420, 434 n.12 (5th Cir. 2001) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); see also Pfizer, 
434 U.S. at 313 (“Yet it is clear that a foreign corporation is entitled to sue for treble damages, 
since the definition of ‘person’ contained in the Sherman and Clayton Acts explicitly includes 
‘corporations and associations existing under or authorized by . . . the laws of any foreign 
country.’”). 
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road approach between American Banana and Alcoa.190 Balancing tests 
can be expensive and may invite greater litigation, but here courts have 
already sufficiently narrowed the spectrum of hypothetical cases to 
stifle any increase in dockets that the balancing test may otherwise 
cause.191 
Despite the FTAIA’s ambiguity, the decisions in Hartford Fire, 
Nippon Paper, Den Norske, and Empagran contain sufficient 
consistencies that provide instruction on what type of conduct and 
injury the FTAIA will exclude from US antitrust jurisdiction. From 
Hartford Fire and Nippon Paper we understand that the FTAIA does 
not stand in the way of a classic effects doctrine claim, that is, one 
which involves defendants that directly harm US consumers, and 
specifically a US plaintiff, irrespective of where the defendant engages 
in the illegal conduct. The decision in Empagran instructs when 
conduct may be beyond the Sherman Act’s reach, i.e., when a claim is 
brought by a non-US. plaintiff to redress foreign injury, especially 
when the defendant is another foreign national.192 The Fifth Circuit and 
the Supreme Court made clear that the United States is no longer in the 
business of acting as the world’s antitrust enforcer.193 Additionally, 
Empagran explains that the FTAIA requires a defendant’s foreign 
                                                                                                                       
190. Matthew C. Franker, Note, Restoration: International Merger Review in the Wake of 
General Electric/Honeywell and the Triumphant Return of Negative Comity, 36 Geo. Wash. Int’l 
L. Rev. 877, 907 (2004) (citing the 1987 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations in 
characterizing Timberlane’s analysis as a “middle-of-the-road approach”); James E. Ward, 
Comment, “Is That Your Final Answer?” The Patchwork Jurisprudence Surrounding the 
Presumption Against Territoriality, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 715, 721 (2002) (commenting on how 
Timberlane’s approach gained widespread acceptance by falling between strict territoriality and 
the effects test). 
191. See, e.g., Doug Melamed, Thoughts About Exclusive Dealing, in EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2007: A REFORMED APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82 EC 433, 438 
(Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Mel Marquis eds., 2008) (criticizing balancing tests pertaining to 
antitrust law). 
192. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 171-75 (holding that the Sherman Act is unavailable to 
foreign plaintiffs with foreign injury); Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 428 (“A transaction between two 
foreign firms . . . should not . . . come within the reach of our antitrust laws.”). 
193. See, e.g., Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 431 (“Any reading of the FTAIA authorizing 
jurisdiction” over claims brought by non-US plaintiffs against non-US defendants to recover 
foreign harm “would open United States courts to global claims on a scale never intended by 
Congress.”). See also Diamond, supra note 12, at 823 n.125, n.126 (citing sources highlighting 
the dangers granting expanded access to foreign plaintiffs under the FTAIA). 
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conduct to cause a cognizable domestic effect, which in turn must have 
caused the plaintiff’s injury.194 
That leaves the question of what type of effect “gives rise to a 
claim” that the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have attempted to address: 
a US plaintiff bringing a claim against a non-US defendant 
encompassing wholly foreign conduct and an effect felt in the United 
States, such as if the US clothier from the opening hypothetical decided 
to sue the Pakistani textile manufacturers in the United States.195 It is 
this type of narrow case, where prescriptive jurisdiction hangs on the 
“directness” of the effect, that a balancing test would prove beneficial 
in the absence of a circuit split resolution.196 So, while the Supreme 
Court has cautioned against case-by-case comity inquiries, this 
balancing test is only employable in a small universe of cases.197 
Consequently, the balancing test would not be “too complex to prove 
workable,” as imagined by the Court in Empagran, particularly taking 
into account the stylized factors to be discussed.198 But even if the case 
technically meets the standards for FTAIA’s exemption, the balancing 
test may still be used to evaluate whether extraterritorial application of 
US antitrust laws is apt.199 
Chiefly, this balancing test would supplement the FTAIA. The 
underlying impetus for the FTAIA’s enactment – responding to 
international criticism of expansive US extraterritorial jurisdiction and 
to calls for recognizing foreign sovereignty where the basis for US 
                                                                                                                       
194. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 173-75 (demonstrating that linguistically the most sensible 
reading of “gives rise to a claim” in the FTAIA refers to “plaintiff’s claim” or “the claim at 
issue”). 
195. Or, conversely, a non-US plaintiff bringing suit against a US defendant for 
exclusively foreign conduct and a domestic effect and injury. Suppose a US oil producer enters 
into a worldwide conspiracy to fix the price of tar produced at its Canadian refinery. The 
producer sells at the fixed, anticompetitive price to one of its wholly-owned subsidiaries in the 
United States with instruction to pass on the price to downstream purchasers in the United States. 
One of those purchasers is a German firm. While the conduct in question was exclusively 
foreign, it seemingly produced an effect in the United States that may “give rise to a claim” for 
the German firm under the Sherman Act. As mentioned, though the FTAIA was meant to limit 
antitrust liability for US sellers transacting abroad with foreign buyers, lawmakers still wanted 
to afford foreign purchasers the protection of US laws when transacting within the United States. 
See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
196. Lotes provides even tighter parameters in holding that in order for an effect to “give 
rise to a claim,” the “effect” must precede the alleged antitrust injury. See 753 F.3d at 414-15. 
197. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 168. 
198. Id. at 168-69 (declining to employ a balancing test). 
199. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 13 (1982) (mentioning that the FTAIA would not bar courts 
from “employ[ing] notions of comity . . . or otherwise [taking] account of the international 
character of the transaction.”). 
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prescriptive jurisdiction is weak – functions as this balancing test’s 
modus operandi. While the difficulty in interpreting “direct” has 
instigated its introduction, the balancing test does not attempt to shed 
any more light on the FTAIA’s contemplation of “direct.” Instead, it 
provides an alternative framework to properly apply the FTAIA where 
the statute’s language makes it impossible to do so. 
As was the balancing test in Timberlane, a balancing test here may 
also be criticized as leaving too much discretion over political inquiries 
(i.e., foreign policy considerations) to the judiciary rather than to the 
executive and legislative branches, where such decisions may rightly 
belong.200 Professor William Dodge, while asserting that US courts 
should engage in judicial unilateralism rather than international comity 
considerations, points out that the judiciary plays an important 
complementary role to a country’s political branches by encouraging 
dialogue and negotiation between sovereigns.201 Though Congress and 
antitrust agencies may be better suited than courts to take account of 
the interest of other nations, courts are nonetheless faced with the task 
                                                                                                                       
200. See Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 7 (observing that antitrust regulators are 
better suited to weigh foreign countries’ interests, “as well as take account of other agencies’ or 
courts’ analysis of the same issues”); John Byron Sandage, Note, Forum Non Conveniens and 
the Extraterritorial Approach of United States Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L.J. 1693, 1699-1701 
(1985) (criticizing “interest-based revisionist” approaches that engaged in interest balancing as 
“both inappropriate and unworkable because it involves courts in weighing sensitive political 
and diplomatic concerns traditionally considered nonjusticiable.”). Indeed, antitrust authorities 
are attempting to avoid unnecessary prosecution by increasing cooperation with foreign 
counterparts. See Terzaken, supra note 70 (detailing cooperation efforts); supra § III.A.2. In 
addition, the DOJ has established an internal policy to use wider discretion when defendants are 
facing parallel enforcement actions abroad. Terzaken, supra note 70 (discussing DOJ efforts to 
curtail prosecutorial overkill). 
201. Dodge, supra note 2, at 106-07. American courts are also well-versed in taking into 
account foreign interests through allowing sovereign representatives to articulate official 
positions in litigation. See, e.g., Empagran, 542 U.S. at 167-68 (relying on non-US government 
amicus curiae briefs asserting national interests in considering international comity); In re 
Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d at 179 (“When, as in this instance, we receive from a foreign 
government an official statement explicating its own laws and regulations, we are bound to 
extend that explication the deference long accorded such proffers received from foreign 
governments.”); BREYER, supra note 7, at 92 (“Since there is no Supreme Court of the World, 
national courts must act piecemeal, without direct coordination, in seeking interpretations that 
can dovetail rather than clash with the working of foreign statutes. And so our Court does, and 
should, listen to foreign voices, to those who understand and can illuminate relevant foreign 
laws and practices.” (emphasis added)). 
“Judicial unilateralism,” as defined by Professor Dodge, implies that courts should only 
consider whether or not the forum’s legislature intended to regulate the conduct at issue without 
regard to foreign interests. See Dodge, supra note 2, at 104-05 (“[A] court should apply a statute 
extraterritorially whenever doing so appears to advance the purposes of the statute and should 
not worry about resolving conflicts of jurisdiction with other nations.”); see also supra note 16. 
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of weighing those interests when judging a party’s right to redress in 
private antitrust litigation.202 
The balancing test should be an exercise in both comity and 
cooperation, an attempt to harmonize counterpoints in the debate over 
antitrust extraterritoriality. As Professor Fox posits, the question is not 
“when should we defer to the inconsistent interests of other nations?” 
but rather “how can the antitrust jurisdictions of the world work 
together to maximize their shared interest in competitive markets, to 
the benefit of consumers and robust or potentially robust business?”203 
Indeed, this comports with Supreme Court’s current approach to 
comity analysis of harmonization rather than avoiding conflict among 
laws.204 Accordingly, the test will have a slightly different focus than 
the one constructed by the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane, which reflects 
an outdated period of international antitrust regulation lacking potent 
modern enforcement tools such as amnesty programs. It will, however, 
encourage the growth of overall worldwide antitrust enforcement, both 
public and private, which ultimately contributes to properly 
functioning international markets.205 
The challenge of achieving proper adjudication of an antitrust 
claim consisting of conduct and injury in two different jurisdictions is 
                                                                                                                       
202. See In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d at 179 (highlighting that the court’s 
decision rested on the submissions from the Chinese government); BREYER, supra note 7, at 107 
(noting that the Empagran Court reached its conclusion with the aid of briefs filed by the 
executive branches of foreign governments); see also supra note 201. 
Outside of filing amicus briefs in private litigation, regulators are otherwise unhelpful for 
weighing national interests as they pertain to international comity. See, e.g., Diamond, supra 
note 12, at 813 (“While the government does consider comity before bringing cases against 
foreign nationals under federal antitrust laws, the majority of litigated cases involving foreign 
nationals, and therefore the development of the case law applying the principle of comity . . . 
have been centered in private antitrust litigation.”). 
203. Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 7. See also Stephen M. Axinn & Christina Shin, 
Globalization and Antitrust: The Last Forty Years and Beyond, 2014 FORDHAM COMP. L. INST. 
514 (B. Hawk ed. 2015) (“[C]onvergence [of national antitrust laws] – whether in connection 
with merger doctrine, cartel enforcement or single firm conduct – is necessary for any advanced 
economy.”). 
204. BREYER, supra note 7, at 96 (“[T]he Court no longer seeks only to avoid direct 
conflicts among laws of different nations; it seeks, rather, to harmonize the enforcement of what 
are often similar national laws.”). See also supra § III.B.3. 
205. See, e.g., Erin C. Fuse Brown & Jaime S. King, The Double-Edged Sword of Health 
Care Integration: Consolidation and Cost Control, 92 Ind. L.J. 55, 85 (2016) (“The goal of any 
antitrust enforcement action is to restore the opportunity for the market to function without the 
illegal restraints on competition.”); Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power in Power Markets: The 
Field-Rate Doctrine and Competition in Electricity, 46 MICH. J.L. REFORM 921, 923 (2013) 
(“Anticompetitive conduct reduces economic efficiency and transfers wealth from consumers to 
producers.”). 
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that national laws must conform to a market that ignores national 
borders.206 With this in mind, the goal should be to promote 
adjudication in the most efficient locale in an effort to maximize world 
welfare, foster growth of antitrust jurisdictions, and avoid 
overregulation.207 There are currently over 120 antitrust jurisdictions, 
many of which are new antitrust jurisdictions or have enacted fresh 
laws allowing for greater access to private redress, such as Israel 
(2006), China (2008), the European Union (2014), the United Kingdom 
(2015), and Hong Kong (2015).208 Letting the laws of these 
jurisdictions develop and inculcate international standards for antitrust 
enforcement strengthens the deterrence of anticompetitive behavior 
and the ability of injured parties to seek recompense.209 Achieving 
                                                                                                                       
206. Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 7-8. 
207. See id. at 7 n.13, 8. See also supra § III.B.3. 
208. See generally Class Actions Law; Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 
1, 2008) 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (China); EC Directive; CRA 
2015; The Competition Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 619 (H.K.) (operational on December 14, 2015). 
See also Axinn & Shin, supra note 203, at 513-15 (discussing the proliferation of antitrust 
jurisdictions since the 1970s, amounting to a current 125 sovereign jurisdictions with 
competition authorities); Consumer & Consumer Protection Authorities Worldwide, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/ international/competition-consumer-protection-
authorities-worldwide [https://perma.cc/8ZMU-7EY4] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (listing 
worldwide competition authorities); supra §§ II.B; III. China and Hong Kong, however, have 
not yet instituted a private right to action, though as noted above overly expansive availability 
of US antitrust claims for non-US private recovery may still have a detrimental effect on public 
enforcement efforts, including developing national jurisprudence. See supra note 110 and 
accompanying text. For greater detail on worldwide anti-cartel regimes, see ANTI-CARTEL 
ENFORCEMENT WORLDWIDE (Maher M. Dabbah & Barry E. Hawk eds., 3 vols., 2009). 
209. See, e.g., First, supra note 16, at 732-34 (arguing that international political consensus 
is integral to effective international antitrust enforcement and that the case-by-case common law 
process of law development is the optimal path to that consensus in the absence of a single 
system of or approach to market place regulation); Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., 
Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels 2 
(May 1998), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/2350130.pdf [https://perma.cc/35HU-
TEWZ] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (“[C]loser co-operation is necessary to deal effectively with 
anticompetitive practices in one country that affect other countries and harm international 
trade.”). As noted above, while national recourse for compensating private loss is currently 
available in a minority of antitrust jurisdictions, it is increasingly acknowledged as a necessary 
tool for under-resourced national competition authorities. See Pheasant, supra note 11, at 59 
(explaining that the European Commission “decided that it would be appropriate to enhance the 
role of private enforcement to support and supplement public enforcement of the competition 
rules” given insufficient resources for governmental competition authorities); Edward 
Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 OR. L. REV. 147, 153-54 (2005) (“Congress created 
the private right of action to supplement public enforcement because it was aware that the 
government would not have the necessary resources to uncover, investigate, and prosecute all 
violations of antitrust laws.”); see also supra note 25. 
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greater international involvement in turn would ostensibly mitigate 
some of the need behind extraterritorial application of US antitrust 
law.210 
Several factors offer helpful guidance. First and most significant, 
does the foreign jurisdiction have an enforcement program in place 
with penalties to deter future anticompetitive conduct and to allow a 
plaintiff to effectively pursue remedial action at both a micro and macro 
level? Emphasis should be placed here on deterrence.211 For instance, 
Judge Wood noted in Minn-Chem: “The host country for [an export] 
cartel will often have no incentive to prosecute it. [It] would logically 
be pleased to reap economic rents from other countries.”212 Moreover, 
such host countries’ legislatures will often not outlaw conduct that 
benefits the home state and results only in foreign harm.213 It should 
also be noted that while many jurisdictions have public enforcement 
programs, many do not have compensatory channels for private 
litigants and where those do exist private recovery efforts are seldom 
brought.214 Second, would extraterritorial application of the US 
                                                                                                                       
210. See supra § II.B. See also Fox, Remedies, supra note 14, at 580 (explaining that the 
United States as the lone robust enforcer of antitrust law is not enough to deter cartels 
worldwide). 
211. See Stiglitz & Orszag Brief, supra note 67, at 7 (noting “the importance of examining 
the strength of antitrust systems in other countries to evaluate whether global cartels are likely 
to be deterred”). In recent years, roughly a third of jurisdictions with antitrust regimes besides 
the United States and the EC have begun to aggressively enforce their national antitrust laws, 
including Brazil, China, India, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. See Terzaken, 
supra note 70. 
212. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 860. See also Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 12 (“In 
the case of export cartels, for example, it is often said in developed countries: This is not our 
problem. Let the importing country sue.”). 
213. See, e.g., Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (granting immunity from 
antitrust liability exporter combinations that aided the war effort); FTAIA (exempting export 
transactions from US antitrust liability); Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
4001-16 (encouraging growth of American exports in part by modifying the application of 
antitrust laws to certain export trade). See also Eleanor M. Fox & Janusz A. Ordover, The 
Harmonization of Competition and Trade Law – The Case for Modest Linkages of Law and 
Limits to Parochial State Action, 19 WORLD COMP. 5, 17 (1995) (“Almost all nations either 
have export exemptions from their cartel laws, or their law expressly does not reach outbound 
trade.”); Immenga, supra note 16, at 96ff (highlighting US, German, European, and Japanese 
competition laws in discussing the conflicts between trade regulation that exempts domestic 
export cartels from competition law regulation and competition policy). 
214. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Report on the Nature and Impact of Hard Core 
Cartels and Sanctions Against Cartels Under National Competition Laws 15 (2002), 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/2081831.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HJA-5LUU ] (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2017) [hereinafter OECD 2002 Report] (discussing private cartel enforcement 
in OECD countries); supra notes 11, 19; see also supra § III. Changes are being made, though. 
As of 2014, the EC issued Directive 2014/104/EU requiring alteration in national laws to 
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antitrust law compromise the efficacy of the DOJ’s amnesty program? 
It is widely acknowledged that the amnesty program serves as an 
important cartel detection and discovery tool in antitrust enforcement, 
so courts would be remiss to forego its consideration lest the very 
purpose the balancing test strives to fulfill be defeated.215 Of course, 
this should also not be seen as the dispositive factor. As discussed 
above in Part II.B, the ability for private parties to enforce antitrust laws 
while receiving compensation for incurred harm plays an important 
role in deterring businesses from committing antitrust violations. Third, 
if there is a foreign enforcement program available to the plaintiff and 
the alleged conduct occurs in several foreign jurisdictions, are there any 
constraints that would stop plaintiff from multiple recoveries for the 
same conduct and injury? While the laws of most antitrust jurisdictions 
base damages on domestic harm, some have punitive measures that 
allow private plaintiffs to receive an amount greater than the harm 
suffered.216 This last factor addresses the potential for 
overcompensation if the incentive and ability exists for a plaintiff to 
bring suit in different jurisdictions.217 
One such solution to this last issue may be found through applying 
procedural principles interjurisdictionally. In addressing how to reach 
optimal deterrence levels for international cartels while nurturing 
                                                                                                                       
facilitate private enforcement of competition law. See supra § II.B. Additionally, other countries, 
such as Israel and the United Kingdom, have made way for class action-style recovery. Id. 
215. See generally Bill Baer, Ass. Att’y General Antitrust Div. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Prosecuting Antitrust Crimes, Remarks as Prepared for the Georgetown University Law Center 
Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/
file/517741/download [https://perma.cc/9SME-6X96] (archived Oct. 26, 2017); Scott D. 
Hammond, Deputy Ass. Att’y General for Crim. Enforcement Antitrust Div. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades, 
Presented at the 24th Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime (Feb. 25, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518241/download [https://perma.cc/MGD9-YZMU] (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2017); Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond & Belinda A. Barnett, Deterrence and 
Detection of Cartels: Using All the Tools and Sanctions, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 207 (2011). See 
also Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, Report and Recommendations 253, 256 (Apr. 2007), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/toc.htm [https://perma.cc/HH8Y-
4U7F] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017). See also supra § III. 
216. OECD 2002 Report, supra note 214, at 15, 19 n.24 (discussing the debate around 
punitive damages in private recompense cases as providing either insufficient or excessive 
deterrence, noting that New Zealand’s study of the issue concluded that punitive damages were 
necessary, but only as exemplary and not treble because the former would provide “more 
accurate signals” and “offer greater fairness.”). 
217. See, e.g., id. (discussing punitive damages in private antitrust litigation, where 
besides the United States, New Zealand has also adopted a punitive damage regime); supra § 
III. However, as discussed most jurisdictions do not provide a private right to sue under national 
antitrust laws. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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growth of developing competition authority regimes, Professor Michal 
Gal has proposed extending the doctrine of collateral estoppel to other 
national jurisdictions, a tool she dubbed the Recognition-of-Judgments 
Mechanism.218 The Mechanism’s primary aim is to enhance “domestic 
as well as global deterrence and welfare.”219 In theory, it would enable 
a decision entered in the United States (or elsewhere) to be the basis 
for bringing suits against defendants in their respective jurisdictions by 
allowing those jurisdictions to rely on factual findings of a reliable and 
fair foreign decision maker.220 Plaintiffs would only have to prove harm 
to their domestic markets and that the foreign decision meets some pre-
specified criteria that ensure reasonable and fair legal reliance.221 
Professor Gal’s mechanism is not without precedent. She points out 
that Brazilian antitrust authorities adopted a less refined version of the 
mechanism in its Vitamins Case cartel decision.222 There, the Brazilian 
antitrust authorities relied on US and EC decisions concerning the 
worldwide cartel, treating them as established facts.223 
The Mechanism promotes efficient distribution of relief by 
location of harm, permitting plaintiffs to be made whole but not to 
recover in excess of the injury – a step towards effectively stripping 
violators of anticompetitive profits without the need for punitive 
measures such as trebling damages.224 Professor Gal explains that this 
also encourages the development of newer antitrust regimes that face 
significant resource constraints by reducing the cost of adjudication, 
further serving the overarching objective of the balancing test.225 
This list, while not exhaustive of all potentially relevant factors, 
provides the appropriate framework to achieve the goal of enhancing 
global antitrust enforcement in tandem with maximizing world 
economic welfare. An example of how this balancing test would work 
may be abstracted from our previous hypothetical with changed facts: 
A is an American company that procures nickel to be smelted and used 
                                                                                                                       
218. Michal S. Gal, Free Movement of Judgments: Increasing Deterrence of International 
Cartels Through Jurisdictional Reliance, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 58 (2010). 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 73-75. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 60-61. 
223. Id. at 61. 
224. See id. at 62-63. 
225. Id. at 73-74 (explaining that the Mechanism removes the costliest part of the process, 
i.e., proving the existence of an international cartel, and limits litigation to the effect on local 
markets). 
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in the production of industrial turbines. A purchases nickel from the 
leading nickel mining company B in the Philippines, which is actively 
engaged in fixing the price of nickel with the second leading nickel 
mining company C, which is located in another country. Both B and C 
make up over fifty percent of global nickel production and sales, and 
all of B’s customers reside outside of the Philippines. The point of sale 
for these transactions occurs in the Philippines through A’s Japanese 
subsidiary, which exists for the sole purpose of purchasing raw material 
and reselling it to the parent company at cost. Manufacture of the 
turbines takes place both abroad and in the United States at A’s 
proprietary factories, though finished turbines from non-US factories 
are routinely shipped to end users in the United States and vice versa.226 
Finally, after a change of ownership, C gets cold feet and applies for 
amnesty with the DOJ in order to avoid potential liability, though A 
had recently begun to become suspicious after realizing steady 
incremental increases in the price of nickel despite both B and C 
discovering new, vast nickel deposits. After the DOJ successfully 
procures a judgment against B after trial, A sues B to recover treble 
damages from overcharges in US federal court.227 
This hypothetical represents a situation not clearly resolved by 
Hartford Fire or Empagran. Here, we have an American plaintiff that 
purchases a price-fixed component in purely foreign transactions 
through a foreign subsidiary to be incorporated in a finished product 
that is then sold on to US consumers. Ostensibly, the relevant legal 
question involves whether there has been a “direct, substantial, or 
foreseeable” effect from B’s conduct on US commerce. But in such a 
case where “direct” may be difficult to define, the previously described 
comity balancing test provides an alternative method of assessing 
whether US prescriptive jurisdiction is indeed proper. Notably, unlike 
the LCD panels in Motorola Mobility, the price-fixed component in this 
hypothetical is a fungible good that would not be a prominent feature 
on the finished good. Therefore, it would be difficult for A to argue that 
it was “targeted” in the same way as Motorola to avoid an indirect 
purchaser characterization. 
                                                                                                                       
226. In this case, a function of available production capacity, timing and volume of orders, 
and cheap shipping costs might explain this type of delivery system. 
227. We can assume for the sake of this hypothetical that the United States has personal 
jurisdiction over B, that venue is proper, and that there are no successful forum non conveniens 
arguments. 
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The first factor operates in two parts.  At the threshold, it considers 
whether the Philippines has relevant antitrust laws governing the export 
conduct that may provide A redress.  If those laws exist, the factor then 
considers whether the Philippines would itself enforce them against a 
domestic firm that profits from selling to foreign customers.  This 
becomes particularly relevant if the firm has already been subject to 
criminal liability in the United States and where the cartel’s conduct 
has little if any negative effect on the Philippines. This is important 
because, assuming that A’s subsidiary is the only entity that made 
purchases of the price-fixed goods during the period of conspiracy, 
Japan would have felt no effect and accordingly would have little if any 
interest in enforcing its own antitrust laws. 
The second factor assesses the amnesty program’s role in the 
discovery of the cartel at hand and any associated detriment arising 
from exposing B to private antitrust liability. In the present case, A may 
have been able to uncover the scheme on its own, though it is unclear 
whether it would have had the resources to bring suit itself assuming it 
was able to pass the pleading stage and reach discovery. 
Finally, the third factor contemplates the potential for being 
overcompensated for conduct that could be adjudicated in a non-US 
jurisdiction. If, as in the present case, a judgment exists on the issue of 
whether the defendant conspired with others to fix prices, Professor 
Gal’s collateral estoppel mechanism may provide some reason for US 
litigants to seek relief from the defendant’s home jurisdiction in light 
of the questionable effect on US commerce, assuming that the country 
has the requisite antitrust laws and accepts the United States’ protective 
procedural measures in reaching such a judgment. The opposite would 
be true if no issues had yet been litigated and resolved. 
Considering these factors in total, maximizing economic welfare 
through properly functioning international markets and encouraging 
the development of international cartel enforcement may in fact 
counsel against adjudication in the United States if recourse for private 
recovery exists in the foreign jurisdiction. Deference and restraint are 
justified if it results in net benefit to such global welfare.228 After all, 
“[n]ational antitrust should operate in the shadow of the true global 
market.”229 
                                                                                                                       
228. See Fox, Remedies, supra note 14, at 581. 
229. Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 8. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This Note argues that in order to create a suitable environment for 
international private redress an international comity balancing test 
should be introduced into US jurisprudence through the opportunity 
provided by the FTAIA “direct effect” criterion. Though the United 
States has historically acted as the world’s courtroom for victimized 
private parties to seek recovering of antitrust injury, worldwide 
jurisdictions are beginning to develop their own legal regimes of 
antitrust enforcement, deterrence, and private recompense. To 
encourage this development, US courts should embrace the current 
Supreme Court’s approach to comity as one predicated upon global 
harmonization rather than conflict avoidance. 
The recent efforts of resolving the “direct effect” definition 
dispute have been unfruitful and have ultimately produced puzzling 
decisions, including one in which foreign defendants were subject to 
criminal liability under the Sherman Act but not civil liability. The 
proposed balancing test responds to the current confusion stemming 
from these efforts by providing an alternative framework through 
which to realize the statute’s purpose. While the late Justice Scalia 
cautioned against using comity balancing tests to determine whether to 
properly subject foreign defendants to US antitrust law, limiting 
parameters provided by existing case law establish sufficient 
conditions to permit a balancing test. 
This balancing test would guide courts in determining the 
propriety of extraterritorial application of US antitrust law for specific 
cases involving proscribed foreign anticompetitive conduct under the 
auspices of promoting the development of global antitrust enforcement 
and maximizing world economic welfare. However, instead of 
weighing traditional comity considerations as in Timberlane, the 
comity balancing test proposed in this Note would focus instead on 
these objectives, i.e., promoting the development of global antitrust 
enforcement and maximizing world economic welfare, as an extension 
of the Supreme Court’s harmonization approach. Ultimately, the 
balancing test would better allow the United States to contemplate and 
incorporate foreign interests in whether to apply US antitrust law, 
promoting international dialogue and encouraging growth of foreign 
private antitrust recourse. 
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